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Abstract
In this study, 190 college students received a
persuasive communication under conditions of high or
low source credibility and high or low ego involvement,
in which

~s w~re

permitted to overtly respond to the

communication or not.

This study, a replication of an

earlier pilot study, was based on two approaches to
attitude

cha~ges

social judgment and cognitive response

analysis of persuasion.

The major hypotheses, designed

to test critical evaluative sets, stated that. less
attitude change will occur (a) in the low rather than
the high credible source (low credible source set),
(b) in the high rather than low involvement (high involvement set), (c) in the high rather than low cognitive response (high cognitive response set), and (d)
for the high involvement, high cognitive response condition, in the high rather than low credible source
(high credible source as threat set).

Results confirmed

the existence of the high cognitive response set, but
did not confirm the existence of the remaining three
sets.

Reasons for the failure to confirm these latter

sets are discussed.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This research is an attempt to demonstrate a previously
never discussed phenomenon in the area of attitude change.

The

phenomenon, in my opinion, is a fairly common one in social
situations.

If a person is presented with a communication pro-

posing a view opposite to his own, and if the communication is
attributed to a highly reputable author, and if the person is
provided the opportunity to offer rebuttal and feels personally
involved in the debate, then the person may view the author as a
threat. and he might present a stronger rebuttal as a result of
these conditions, thereby reinforcing nis previous position.

The

research is modeled after a similar situation in the realm of
track and field sports.

A runner will run to defeat his opponent.

As his opponent is viewed as a serious threat to the runner's own
competence, the runner will run faster to defeat him.

The same

situation would be present in a political debate, a discussion
among colleagues, and perhaps in certain advertising situations.
This present study seeks to replicate and elaborate upon the
results of an earlier pilot study {Scileppi, 1971) which explored
the same phenomenon.

1
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More specifically this paper is an attempt to investigate th
process of attitude change and to determine the effects of three
variables•

source credibility, ego-involvement, and cognitive

response expression facilitation and their interactions, on attitude change.

The research was prepared in order to elaborate upo

two major approaches to attitude change, the social judgment-perceptual set approach and the cognitive response analysis to persuasion.

Each of these two orientations will be considered in

succession, along with the variables relevant to these theories
and to this research.

Finally, the interaction.of the three

variables will be considered, in view of these two approaches, an
the merits of a new concept, "the high credible source as threat"
evaluative set will be discussed.
The Social Judgment Approach
The social judgment approach, initiated by Sherif and
Hovland (1961) is basically concerned with the m&iner in which an
individual forms a reference scale with which to perceive and to
judge a persuasive communication.

The approach originated in the

area of psychophysics and has been adopted by these and other
social psychologists as a new perspective with which to study
attitude formation and change.

Sherif and Hovland's research in-

volved the manner in which the individual perceived the degree of
discrepancy between his own position on.an issue and the position
of a persuasive communication.

These researchers maintained that

a person would judge the communication by comparing it with some

J
anchor or frame of reference, and then determine whether the posi
tion advanced by the communication fell into his latitude of acceptance or into the range of his rejection.

If the position o.f

the communication fell into the former category, the individual
assimilated the new position into his own, and attitude change
toward the position of the communication occurred as a direct
function of the degree of discrepancy.

If the communication fell

into the latter category, the individual rejected the new position, and perceived the communication as expressing a viewpoint
more discrepant from his own position than it actually was.

In

this case, he would contrast his position with that of the communication, and if any attitude change occurred at all, it would
be in the direction opposite that advocated by the communication,
i.e., attitude change would be a decreasing function of the degre
of discrepancy.

A third alternative occurred if the communicatio

fell into neither of these two categories.

In this case, the

individual perceived that the communication lay in his latitude
of non-commitment and presumably would have no effect on his
attitude.
Ego Involvement
Sherif and his associates (Sherif and Hovland, 19611 Sherif
and Sherif, 1967; Sherif, Sherif and Nebergal, 1965) found that
certain variables affected the size of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment.

One of the more important

of these variables-· was ego involvement.

4
The definition of the term, attitudinal involvement, has
been modified and altered often in the past twenty-five years.
Sherif and Cantril (1947) were the first major authors to apply
the term ego involvement to the. study of attitudes.

These re-

searchers considered ego involvement to refer to any stimulus related by the person to himself.

This definition included those

attitudes with which the person identifies and makes part of himself, and which are incorporated into his self definition and become aspects of his frame of reference.

Sherif and Cantril sug-

gested that the degree of ego involvement determined how greatly
an individual would "cling to" a particular attitude.

Much of

Sherif 's later work on involvement concerned this "cling to"
aspect of attitudes.
More recently, other researchers have attempted to divide
ego involvement more precisely into its various components.
typical breakdown was offered independently by
and Greenwald (1965).

Fr~edman

A

(1964)

These researchers defined position involve-

ment as interest in, or commitment to a particular position on an
issue·; that is adherence to a prior position or decision.

Solu-

tion involvement, on the other hand, was defined by these authors
as interest in an issue, without reference to a particular position, and the commitment to seeking a good solution to a problem.
It could be argued that the two types of involvements are not
basically distinct.

.

Solution involvement could result from a

positive self concept in which the individual feels motivated to

5
come to a good solution to a problem in order to maintain his
image of himself as a critical evaluator and intelligent person.
such a situation could also be called position involvement, if
one considers that the attitude issue in question is a person's
self concept, and the position adhered to is a favorable self
concept.
Furthermore, .one would expect that the two types of involvement exist together, phenomenologically.

Miller (1965) views ego

involvement as a combination of four factors.

In addition to

position and solution involvement, Miller also lists social support and frequent rehearsal of arguments supporting one's position as indicative of attitudinal ego involvement.

High involve-

ment, according to Miller, implies that all factors are present.
Thus Miller does not see position and solution involvement as
occurring independently of each other.
Ostrom and Brock (1968) returned to

Sheri~

and Cantril's

(1947) broad definition of ego involvement as referring to the
manner in which the individual identifies himself.

These re-

searchers have investigated the process relating attitudes and
personally held values.

In their model, Ostrom and Brock pre-

dicted that involvement was dependent on the number of values
related to the attitude, the degree of relationship between the
attitude and the value, and the centrality to the self concept of
the value.

Thus, emphasis has moved fr6m isolating the types of

involvement to considerations of the process by which an attitude
becomes ego involving, and the results of involvement.

6

In the social judgment approach, as ego involvement increased, Sherif and his associates considered the person's own
position would become the internal anchor from which the scales
of reference were based, and that the internal anchor is more influential than external anchor standards in forming judgments.
The main effects of ego involvement hypothesized by Sherif and
Hovland (1961) we:r;-e that involvement would tend to exaggerate
both the assimilation and contrast effects, distorting the perceived position of the communication, and that the point on the
continuum of attitude positions in which a shift from assimilation to contrast occurred would move closer to the individual's
own position.

Thus a highly involved person would have a wider

latitude of rejection and a narrower latitude of acceptance than
a less involved person.

Later empirical results (Sherif &

Sherif, 1967) led Sherif to conclude that the latitude of acceptance does not change but that high ego involvement
. causes the
latitude of rejection to enlarge, making the latitude of noncommitment smaller.
The literature on involvement has shown some fairly consistent trends.

Freedman (1964), using a concept formation task,

found that more change in concept occurred under low involvement
than under high involvement.

Involvement according to Freedman,

concerned the importance to the subject of an aspect of the experimental task, and the salience of that sub-task in determining
intelligence level.

A number of the other researchers supported

the hypothesis of the social judgment approaches that low

~

---------------------------------:--------------------------------,
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involvement will cause more attitude changes than high involvement.

Aiello (1967) found persuasibility was negatively corre-

lated to .involvement.

Sereno (1968) using a belief-discrepant

communication, found that although both the high involvement and
low involvement groups did exhibit attitude change toward the
communication, the attitude change of the low involvement group
was significantly greater than that of the high involvement subjects.

Rhine and Severance (1970), using an increase-in-tuition

topic, found more attitude change occurred under low involvement
than for high involvement.

Atkins and Bieri (1968) in an experi-

ment evaluating the effects of the levels of involvement on
social judgment, found heightened involvement caused greater contrast effects, which cause less change, particularly in highly
discrepant messages.

McGinnies (1968) relates two experiments

conducted in Taiwan and Japan which also support the hypothesis
that more attitude change occurs under low ego-involvement
than
,.
under high involvement.
Edwards and his associates (Edwards, 1970; Edwards & Ostrom,
1969, using research stemming from Ostrom and Brock's cognitive
-

bonding model on a person perception topic, found that as the individual's attitude toward the stimulus person was bonded to more
central values (i.e., as involvement increased), there was
greater resistance to attitude change, thus supporting Sherif and
Hovland's hypothesis.
One of the few experiments which did not confirm Sherif and
Hovland's hypothesis was conducted by Miller (1965).

In this
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study, Miller manipulated involvement by stressing the importance
of the issue, and by committing the subjects to distribute literature in.support of the attitudes among other methods.

Miller

found no difference in the latitudes of acceptance and rejection
caused by involvement, thus not confirming the involvement hypothesis.

The vast body of literature, however, continues to sup-

port the hypothesis.

Research conducted by the author (Johnson &

Scileppi, 1969; Scileppi, 1971) involving both high school and
college students has demonstrated that subjects in the high involvement condition showed significantly less attitude change
than subjects in the low involvement condition.
The problem with much of the research which has been used as
evidence supporting this thesis is that Sherif and many other researchers have used natural groups with different levels of involvement, and a variety of types of issues, both of which vary
on many continua other than involvement, thus confounding the
involvement variable.

Johnson and Scileppi (1969) utilized a

different method to manipulate involvement.

These researchers

varied the stated purpose of the research while retaining the
communication ·concerning the same topic, with samples of subjects
taken from the same population.

In this study, high involvement

was achieved by informing high school males that the purpose of
the research, funded by a national foundation, concerned how well
they as high school students could make mature, sound and intelligent judgments.

Low involvement was produced·by informing

similar students that t.he -ourpose of the research was to
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standardize some materials, and that the researchers were not
interested in their opinions as such.

In this way, only involve-

ment is manipulated, and there is a smaller possibility that
other facto+s are influencing these results.
In an unpublished study (Scileppi, 1971) used a similar
method to manipulate ego involvement for college students.

In

this study, the high involvement treatment consisted of stating
that the purpose of the study was to determine whether college
students aged eighteen to twenty years were capable of evaluating
material relevant to political issues as an indication of their
qualifications to vote in national

~lections.

The low involve-

ment treatment was nearly identical to the earlier Johnson and
Scileppi (1969) study.
Involvement was considered to be an important variable in
the present study, both in terms of its relationship to the
evaluative set theory and also because of the variable's potenr

tial interaction with the other two independent variables in the
study.

Also, high involvement was found to be of crucial impor-

tance in the earlier Scileppi (1971) pilot study in developing
the situation "in which the subject would feel motivated to compete against the author of the discrepant communication.
Source Credibility
Another variable discussed by She~if and Sherif (1967) relevant to the social judgment approach is source credibility.
Source credibility refers to the degree to which the subject

-
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perceives the source as being knowledgeable on the issue and as
being motivated to communicate his knowledge.

Basically, source

credibility involves expertise and trustworthiness (McGuire,

1968).

The Sherifs have postulated that as the credibility and

status of the source increase, the latitude of acceptance will
increase and the latitude of rejection will decrease.

Thus, at-

titude change in the direction of the source •_s position will be
directly related to the source's credibility.

This conclusion is

by no means unique to the social judgment approach.

Most theo-

rists following a cognitive consistency approach or_ a learningreinforcement approach have made the. same hypothesis.

Research

has demonstrated this relationship starting from the earliest
studies (Hovland & Weiss, 19.52).

Insko (1967), after reviewing

all the relevant research, stated that this conclusion has been
widely accepted, and that all that remains in question are the
reasons for the relationship.

More recently, howeyer, the uni-

versality of this hypothesis has been questioned.

A number of re-

searchers have found that source effects attenuate or even dis-

.

appear completely under certain conditions.

Variables affecting

and limiting source effects fall into two categories, communication factors and subject factors.

Thus far, the first category

has been noticeably less significant and less extensive than the
latter.

One example of a communication factor attenuating source

effects is given by Goldberg (1970).

He found

that when the

persuasive message was ambiguous, the usual source effects dropped
out;

The'-

sttbject, according to Goldberg, has less motivation to
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agree with a high credible source associated with an ambiguous
communication.
Recently, a large body of literature has been compiled concerning the effects of subject factors which attenuate source
effects on attitude change.

Most of this literature concerns the

area of inner directed versus other directed personalities or in
Sherif and Hovland's terms and theories, individuals who have
internal or external scales of reference.

For example, Ritchie

and Phares (1969) found that internally controlled subjects were
less affected by high prestige sources than externally controlled
subjects.

In the same vein, Koslin, Stoops and Loh (1967) found

that the more stable subjects were also less affected by the
source than less stable subjects.

Concerning other subject

traits, Johnson, Torcivia and Poprick (1968) found that high
authoritarian subjects were less affected by source credibility
difference than low

authorit~rian

subjects.

Johnson and Torcivia

(1968), in a similar experiment, found that the personality trait
of nonacquiescence also decreases source credibility effects.
Furthermore, cognitive states can be induced in subjects which
will interact with source credibility in affecting attitude
change.

Sigall and Helmreich (1969) and Johnson, Izzett and

Honig (1970), working from different theoretical approaches,
found high irrelevant fear induced in subjects caused
ential source effects to disappear.

t~e

differ-

~--------------------~~---------------------,
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Interaction of Involvement and Credibility
the Evaluative Set Model

ind

Ego involvement is another factor which limits source
credibility effects.

Sherif and Sherif in a 1967 evaluation of

.

the social judgment approach theorized
that source effects will
.
only occur under low ego involvement, since in this condition, .
the subject does not have an internal standard for evaluating an
unfamiliar or neutral message which is not involving for him;
however, under high ego involvement, the subject has less need
for an external standard or anchor, as his internal anchor serves
as his point of reference for· making the judgment.

This source

by involvement interaction has been found often in the literature
of the last four years, by a number of researchers working independently.

In a direct test of Sherif's hypothesis, Sereno (1968

found that the high credible source had differential effects unde
low and high ego involvement.

Under low involvement, the high

source produced significantly more attitude change than under
high ego involvement.

Unfortunately, Sereno failed to include a

low credible source in his experiment, so his results do not include all possibilities in this two way interaction.

McGinnies

(1968) reported the results of two 1965 experiments, one conducte
in· Taiwan and the other in Japan, concerning the· issue of Americ
involvement in Viet Nam.

The Taiwan experiment demonstrated

source and involvement main effects

bu~

no interaction, whereas

in the Japanese experiment, there was a significant source by
involvement interaction.

In this latter experiment, the high

(
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credible source produced significantly greater attitude change in
the low involvement treatment than in any of the other three conditions.

Furthermore, the differential source effects disappeare

under high involvement.
same interaction effect.

Rhine and Serverance (1970) found the
In this study, a significantly greater

·difference in attitude change due to source credibility under low
involvement was found.
the same effect.

Johnson and Scileppi (1969) also found

These latter researchers elaborated upon the

basic social judgment theories by explaining these results in
terms of an evaluation set model.

They argued that source credi-

bility creates.an evaluative set with which the subject perceives
the communication differentially.

The high credible source pre-

disposes the subject to accept the message less critically,
whereas the low credible source influences the subject to perceiv
the message more critically and to reject the communication more
readily.
~go

set.

In the same study, Johnson and Scileppi suggest that

involvement could be seen as producing a similar evaluative
A subject who was led to perceive the issue as more impor-

tant to himself would become more involved in his position and
would tend to be more critical in his evaluation of a communication advocating a position discrepant from his own, than if he
were less involved in the issue.

Thus as a result of either of

these critical evaluative sets, low source credibility or high
involvement, an individual's latitude of acceptance will decrease
with less assimilation.

More significantly, an individual's lati

tude of rejection would increase, with greater contrast effects

r
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resulting.

The effects of these two critical evaluative sets pro-

duce similar effects, and if either set is present, attitude
change decreases.

The Johnson and Scileppi (1969) study, as well

as the McGinnies 1968 Japanese study, found that the source by involvement interaction was' due primarily to the increase in attitude change of the high credible source-low involvement treatment,
with the other three treatments producing mutually similar and
smaller amounts of attitude change.

This led Scileppi (1971) to

suggest that these two critical evaluative sets are non-additive.
Thus an all or nothing threshold effect exists.

That is, if

either of these two critical evaluative sets is present, less
attitude change results, but the amount of attitude change is not
further decreased by the presence of both sets.

If the high in-

volvement critical evaluative set is present, low source credibility will not decrease attitude change any further.

Similarly,

if the low source credibility critical evaluative . set is present,
high involvement will not further decrease attitude change.
explanation for this finding is not as yet understood.

The

The

present study seeks to shed some light on this question by including another variable, cognitive response expression facilitation,
which under certain conditions may produce still a third critical
evaluative set.

More elaboration concerning the variable will be

given later in the paper, but first it is appropriate to summarize
the source and involvement variables.
Concerning the ego involvement variable, the source credibility variable and the source by involvement interaction,. the
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present study seeks to confirm the following hypotheses. ·Low involvement will result in more attitude change 1 than high involvement (Hypothesis One).

In those treatments which are conducted

in a manner similar to the vast majority of attitude change
studies (i.e., low cognitive response expression facilitation conditions) there will appear a source by involvement interaction.
Specifically, the effects of source credibility differences will
occur only under low ego involvement conditions (Hypothesis Two).
Finally, a main effect due to source will result in an attitude
more favorable to the high source's position than to the low
credible source (Hypothesis Three).
Cognitive Response to Persuasion
The second major aspect of the present study involves A. G.
Greenwald's (1968) cognitive response to persuaaion analysis of
attitude change.

By using this method to study the mediational

cognitive processes involved in attitude change, a greater understanding of the processes proposed in the evaluative set theory
may be gained.

Basically, Greenwald reasons that when an

1 In the remainder of this paper, the phrases "attitude
change" and "attitude favorability to the source's position" will
be used interchangeably. Attitude change is perhaps a less accurate term, as no attitude pretests were administered to the
subjects. However, since the topic was fictitious, the subjects
should not have developed an attitude prior to receiving the information in the test booklet. Also, the two control groups
serve as a reasonable indication of the.average subject's attitude change if one assumes that all subjects had attitudes simila
to the control groups before the experimental manipulation was
administered.

,
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individual is exposed to a persuasive communication, he is motivated to reconcile the message with his existing knowledge,
values and feelings, which are not actually present in the
cation.

communi~

He therefore rehearses his existing cognitive elements

relevant to the message, which includes his initial attitude concerning the issue.

The reading of a persuasive communication may

actually recall to the person his own prior attitude, thus defeating the purpose of the communication.

Thus an opposing com-

munication could strengthen a person's own attitude because he is
led to rehearse his own position and relearn that position better.
Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield (1949), and Kelman (1953) include
the possibility that these cognitive rehearsals could act as interfering responses decreasing the learning or the acceptance of
the persuasive communication which generated these responses.
Greenwald named the cognitive rehearsal the "cognitive response to persuasion."

In his research, he_has used these re-

sponses as independent variables in the study of attitude change.
Thus, he has studied the relative effects on attitude change of
both the persuasive communication and the cognitive responses to
that communication.

Greenwald included response or evaluative

sets as one aspect of these cognitive responses.
affect the subject's

p~rception

of the salience

Response sets

of

nitions in evaluating the persuasive communication.

particular cogGreenwald

further contends that the mere recall of the content of the persuasive communication bears little if any relationship with the
attitude change, since the content of the message will only serve

rr
'r

17

as a stimulus, provoking the rehearsal of the person's previous
attitudinal position. Thus a larger percentage of the variance
involved in such attitude change research will depend on the subject's initial feelings about the issue and the degree to which he
is motivated to rehearse his own position while attending to the

persuasive communication than on the content of the persuasive
communication itself.

Greenwald (1968) cited an unpublished ex-

periment by Love as supporting this conclusion.

In Love's study,

subjects were asked to read one communication advocating either
that Puerto Rico become the 5lst state or that the Secretary of
State be elected by the people.

Each of the communications was

divided into three parts, with the main or theme sentence underlined in advance for each part.
to these statements.

The subjects were asked to react

Later, they were asked to recall their cog-

nitive reactions during the communication.
these three variables (recall of

Love tested each of

communicat~on,

recall of self

generated responses, and the content of those respcnses) as predictors of attitude change.

The results indicated that the actual

content of the cognitive responses, and the recall of these selfgenerated responses correlated significantly greater with attitude
change than the recall of the main points of the message.

In mos1

of Greenwald's work, an assumption is made that the subject is
continually making cognitive responses to persuasive communications, and that asking a person to verbalize or write responses
does not change the degree or intensity of the cognitive responses
but represents only a change from covert to overt expression

18

,(Greenwald, personal communication January 5, 1971).

However,

Scileppi (1971) found that requesting the subjects to write down
·responses facilitated their expression and increased their intensity.

Those subjects involved in writing their cognitive re-

sponses demonstrated significantly less favorable attitudes towar
the position advocated by the persuasive communication than the
subjects not asked to express their cognitive responses.
The present paper views the cognitive response expression
facilitation as a critical evaluative set, orienting the individual to rehearse and defend his initial position more than if he
were asked merely to read the persuasive communication. 1 It is
hypothesized that cognitive response expression facilitation
(high cognitive response) will produce less attitude change than
merely reading the communication (low cognitive response) (Hypothesis Four).

It is also predicted that the degree of favorabil-

ity to the source's position of the cognitive response statements
in the high cognitive response conditions will be highly correlated with attitude change (Hypothesis Five).
·Scileppi (1971) also found a tendency toward greater recall
of the persuasive communication for the high cognitive response
1 considering cognitive response as a critical evaluative set
is not opposed to the counterarguing research (cf. Deaux, 1969,
Rodgers and Thistlethwaite, 1968). All that is implied by the
present model is that encouraging the overt expression of one's
thoughts on the message causes the indiyidual to view the materia
more critically. Thus, a perceptual set is established. This
evaluative set will cause more intense counterarguing to take
place. The set is the predisposing factor, the more intense
counterarguing represents the process which results.

groups than for the low cognitive response groups.

Thus it would

appear that by asking a subject to verbalize his responses to the
communication, he considered the communication more seriously and
pondered over it more closely.

This lends more evidence to the

view that cognitive response expression facilitation is a critica
evaluative set model, and that through the request for verbalization, the individual structures his cognitive abilities for this
task to a greater extent than if he were not asked to write his
responses.

Therefore, it is predicted that the amount of recall

of the persuasive communication will be significantly greater in
the high cognitive response treatment than for the low cognitive
response treatment1 (Hypothesis Six). As _a corollary to the
fourth and sixth hypotheses it is also predicted that there will
be a significant negative correlation between the amount of recal
and attitude change (Hypothesis Seven). 2
1 It is interesting to note that in the high cognitive response condition, although exposure to the persuasive communication may be longer, attitude change toward that communication is
predicted to be less than the low cognitive response group.
2 It should be emphasized at this point that all the above
predictions concerning cognitive response and recall will occur
only in situations in which the persuasive communication is discrepant from the subject's initial position on the issue. In
order to achieve a standard initial opinion, each subject first
read an objectively worded communication concerning an unfamilia
fictitious issue, involving a large industrial company moving int
a small town. The persuasive communication followed, written in
a personalistic manner. and advocating a position contrary to
that suggested by the more objectiye communication. As the
second communication was advocating a position contrary to the
objective communication, the cognitive responses to the persuasive communication were expected to be generally negative.
I
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Another result of high cognitive response expression facilitation is that it tends. to lower the subject's evaluation of the
source.

T.his finding was noted in the earlier Scileppi {1971)

study as a nonsignificant trend.

It was inferred in that earlier

work that as the subject develops his own cognitive responses to
the source's argument, he devalues the author of those arguments.
Subjects in the high cognitive response condition tend to rate
the source as being less trustworthy, less intelligent and less
competent than those subjects in the low cognitive response condition.

Thus, in the present study, it was predicted that high

cognitive response will result in lower source ratings.than under
the low cognitive response condition {Hypothesis Eight).
In summary, high cognitive response expression facilitation
tends to produce greater recall of the persuasive communication
but at the same time, it allows the subject to develop his own
arguments better, and causes him to derogate the author of the
persuasive communication.

Although there is

great~r

recall, the

net effect of cognitive rehearsal and overt cognitive responding
is to decrease attitude favorability toward the position advocated
by the persuasive communication.
The cognitive responses serve a threefold role.

First, the

encouragement to respond overtly is an independent variable.

Its

presence or absence is predicted to produce an effect on attitude
change.

Secondly, the cognitive responses serve as mediator

variables.

By inspection of the cognitive responses, the process

of attitude change, that is, the individual's acceptance or

I

/'
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rejection of the message, can be studied.

Finally, the subject's

rating of their own cognitive responses serves as a dependent
variable, as they indicate the subject's final position on the
issue.
'

High Credible Source as Threat Evaluative Set
The present study has been devised in order to show the roles
of social judgment and cognitive response analysis approaches to
attitude change.

Both theories discuss evaluative sets; the

social judgment theory explains the effect of set on attitude
change, whereas the cognitive response approach sheds light on the
method by which a set operates.

It is proposed that, given a con-

dition producing a critical evaluative set, less attitude change
should result due to the lack of acceptance of the message.

This

lack of acceptance should be mediated through the subject's
counterarguing against the message, which can be observed in the
cognitive response ratings.
The present experiment is an attempt to confirm the existence
of the source and involvement sets and also to confirm the existence of another critical evaluative set, as well as to explore the
interaction of the three sets.

In the condition in which the sub-

ject is highly involved in an issue, and therefore experiences a
critical evaluative set toward a discrepant communication, he will
counterargue as previously described.

If the subject perceives

that the discrepant message is a strong one due to its attribution
to a highly credible source, he will perceive the source as more·
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threatening than the lower source and as a result, he will be
motivated to defend his position, and he will counterargue more
strongly and intensely against the message if given a chance to
respond to the message.

This follows analogously from the widely

held belief that a man attempts to outpace his opponent and that a
person will be motivated to fight more strongly against a more
capable opponent rather than a weaker one.

Since the message is

the same in all conditions, increased counterarguing due to this
set evaluation of the high credible source as threat should result
in less attitude change than the low credible source, given that e
critical evaluative set due to high involvement already exists.
Thus in this condition, a mild source boomerang effect should result, which again reopens the question of the universality of
Insko's conclusion that attitude change varies directly with
source credibility.

This effect will be lessened however but

probably will not disappear, since the low
produces a critical evaluative set.

credib~e

source also

The Scileppi (1971) experi-

ment, a pilot study of the present experiment, attempted to
demonstrate the existence of this high source as threat critical
evaluative set.

In that study, the high credible source-high in-

volvement high cognitive response treatment did produce less attitude change toward the.position advocated by the communication
than did the parallel low credible source treatment.
ence, however, was not significant.

The differ-

The present study has repli-

cated the earlier study, but with some slight modification in an
attempt to strengthen the intended manipulation and to demonstrate

,,.

i.
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the critical evaluative sets.

The source identifications, the in-

volvement manipulation, and the objective message prior to the
persuasive communication were improved.

The present study pre-

dicts that there will be less attitude change and less favorable
cognitive response ratings in the high rather than the low credible source treatment under high involvement, high cognitive response condition due to the existence of a high credible source as
threat critical evaluative set (Hypothesis Nine).
In summary, the present study makes the following predictionsa
1.

Low involvement in one's initial stand will result in
more attitude change than high involvement.

2.

The effects of source credibility will occur only under
low involvement.

3.

The high credible source will produce an attitude more
favorable to the source's position than ,.the low credible
source.

4.

High cognitive response will produce less attitude change
than low cognitive response.

5.

In.the high cognitive response condition, the degree of
favorability to the source's position of the cognitive
response statements will be positively correlated with
attitude change.

6,

The amount of recall of the persuasive communication
will be significantly greater for the high cognitive
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response treatment than for the low cognitive response
treatment.

7.

There will be a significant negative correlation between
the amount of recall and attitude change.

8.

High cognitive response will result in less favorable
source ratings than the low cognitive response condition.

9.

There will be less attitude change and less favorable
cognitive response ratings in the high rather than the
low credible source treatment under the high cognitive
response-high involvement condition, and not under other
conditions.

Concerning the main dependent variable, attitude change, a
three-way interaction is predicted in hypothesis nine, such that
the high credible source will produce less attitude change than
the low credible source under the high involvement, high cognitive
response condition, but not under other

condition~.

A two-way source by involvement interaction is predicted in
hypothesis two such that the usual source credibility effects will
occur only under low involvement, and not under high involvement.
Finally, main source effects are predicted in hypothesis
three, main involvement effects are predicted in hypothesis one,
and main cognitive response effects are predicted in hypothesis
four.

CHAPT~R

II

METHOD
A hypothetical issue' was chosen to test the experimental hypotheses.

The issue involved a fictitious situation concerning a

small, poor town deciding upon whether to allow a company to buil
a large factory in the town.

An information-oriented, objective

communication was presented to the subjects which emphasized the
benefits the'factory would bring. to the townspeople.

The subjects

were then given a persuasive communication which emphasized the
harm that the factory would do to the town.

Thus the information

in the first communication was intended to produce an attitude
'favorable to the factory's entry into the town, while the persuasive communication proposed a view discrepant from the first communication.
Subjects
The subjects were 190 male and female college students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Loyola University of
Chicago.

Over 95% of the subjects were between the ages of

eighteen and twenty years old.
1

They received one· hour's experi-

mental credit for participation in this experiment.

The subjects

were not told the actual purpose of the.experiment, and were
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tested in small groups varying in size from two to fifteen
people.

The subjects were randomly assigned to experimental con-

ditions with nineteen per cell.
Desim

~

A 2 x 2 x 2 design, with two levels of each of three variables (source credibility, ego involvement, and cognitive response) with two control groups was used in this experiment.

All

subjects in the eight experimental groups received a persuasive
communication.

This communication was attributed to a high or

low credible source, and was given under either high or low ego
involvement conditions.

The subjects were either requested to

write cognitive responses to the arguments presented in the communication or not,

The design also included two control groups

who received either one communication

~oncerning

an objective ac-

count of the situation in the town or two communications, the objective account and the persuasive communication.·· There were six
categories of dependent variables•

measures of attitude change,

emotional involvement, cognitive response ratings, source evaluations, recall and time.
Independent Variables
Ego involvement conditions.--On the second page of the test
booklet, the subjects read a statement that was purported to be
the purpose of the study.

For the low ego involvement condition

it was stated that the purpose was to standardize some of the
materials in the test booklet for later research, and that the
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experimenters were not interested in the subjects' opinions.

The

actual statement was as follows&·
The purpose of this study is to standardize some of the
study for use in later research. We are not particularly
interested in your attitudes or opinions, but only to see if
the materials can be used in later studies.
For the high involvement condition, the subjects were informed that the purpose of the study was to determine possible
criteria for voting in national elections, and to see whether
eighteen to twenty year olds are able to critically evaluate
material and make sound and intelligent judgments concerning what
they have read.

The subjects in this condition were also told

that the study was sponsored by a joint congressional committee
studying the quality of voting.

The high involvement manipulatio

was as follows•
The purpose of this study is to determine whether there
are ways of differentiating good voters from bad voters in
state and Federal elections. This particular study grew out
of a recent controversy in Congress concerning possible differences in the manner of thinking between 18 to 20 year
olds, and those 21 and over. This research, sponsored by th
joint congressional committee on voter regulations and by
several state legislatures, is being undertaken in selected
colleges and universities throughout the country to study th
problem, and to make recommendations concerning the establishment of meaningful criteria to evaluate the quality of
voter judgment and behavior, to be used in the 1972 Presiden
tial election. Specifically, this study is concerned with
two questions• Are there meaningful differences in ability
to weigh information between those individuals 18 to 20 year
old and those 21 and over? Can college students critically
evaluate material relevant to political issues, and make
sound intelligent judgments concerning what they have read •

.

Cognitive response conditions.--On the second page, the subjects read the directions which contained this manipulation.

The
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iow cognitive response expression condition group were instructed
merely to read the arguments on the next page carefully.
The high facilitation cognitive response expression groups
were instructed to read each argument carefully, and to express
their thoughts, feelings and opinions on each argument immediatel
after reading them, on a lined sheet of paper which was provided.
The actual directions were as followsa
On the next page you will find a blank sheet of paper.
Detach this sheet and place it on the side of your desk. On
the following page, you will find a list of arguments included in the letter by one of the town's residents, Please
read each statement carefully, and immediately after reading
each statement, write a response to that statement on the
blank sheet on the space provided. Include all your thought
and feelings on the statement. Write as much as you want,
but express only one idea in each sentence you write.

Source credibility condition.--Also on the second page
booklet, the subjects were given short descriptions of the high
or low credible source.

The high credible source was described a

an intelligent, respected, very active and publicly-minded life-

long resident of the town, while the low credible source was described as an ordinary middle-aged man who moved to the town less
than six months ago and had not yet made many friendships in town.
The high ere di ble source ..was described in the test booklet as
follows•
The following letter was written by one of the leading
citizens of the town, a very respected and intelligent perso
who has performed a number of· publ~c services in the town
throughout his lifetime. He has been an influential member
of many of the town's civic organizations, and the general
feeling in the town is that he is a trustworthy and an
honorable man. This prominent resident has spoken out on th

29
major issues affecting the town's future on many occasions
in the past.
The low credible source was described as follows•
The following letter was written by a middle-aged man,
one of the few people to move into the town recently (within
the last six months, according to his letter}. This man
left his former residence in another state after he had run
unsuccessfully for a' small public office. He stated that he
had few supporters there, as others did not understand him ·
and apparently did not place much trust and confidence in
him. Although having made few friends in his present town a
yet, he claims to understand the feelings of the town.
Both source biographies ended with the statement that the author
"was definitely against the company moving into the town, due to
the reasons mentioned (and printed below}."
Dependent Variables
The five main groups of dependent measures used in this stud
included attitude scales, measures of emotional involvement, cog- I
nitive resp9nse ratings, source evaluation scales, and measures o
recall.

The particular measures used are described in further

detail later on in this paper.

,.·

Attitude.--There were four Likert attitude scales which were
combined to yield a total attitude measure.

These attitude scale

concerned the subject's attitude toward the company moving into
the town.
Emotional involvement.--There were four measures of emotiona
involvement.

The first three were similar in nature and were

combined to form a general emotional involvement measure.

These

included ratings of intensity of feeling, importance of the issue

and

involvement in the issue.

The fourth measure of emotional in-

volvement concerned the subject's perception of the amount of
effort he made in the experiment.
Cognitive responses.--The cognitive response ratings involve
the subject judging the degree to which his ten cognitive responses were favorable to the persuasive communication.

The sub-

ject was instructed to rate each response on a five point scale.
Source evaluation.--There were seven source evaluation
ratings covering the subject's perception of the source's trustworthiness, intelligence, competence, social activity, "threateningness," intent to persuade, and the source's position on the
issue.

The first three measures, trustworthiness, intelligence

and competence, were measures of source credibility as defined by
McGuire (1968), and were therefore combined into one measure.
Recall.--Recall was measured by instructing the subject to
write down as many arguments included in the persuasive communication as he could.

In addition, four fill-in-the-blank type ques-

tions were included, which involved material present in the first
objective communication.
A measure of the time taken to complete the cognitive responses was also included in the study, although this measure
was not, strictly speaking, a dependent variable relevant to
the experimental hypothesis, but was included for future
research.
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.frocedure
The test booklets were "shuffled" to insure random assignmen
of the subjects to treatments, and placed face down on students
desks in an average sized classroom.

One desk was left empty be-

tween every two desks with booklets, in order to discourage any
student interaction.

The students were then admitted to the room

and were permitted to take any unoccupied desk with a test bookle
on it.

They were instructed not to turn over the booklet until

they were told to do so by the experimenter.

When all the sub-

jects were seated, the experimenter explained to the subjects tha
they would be asked to read the material in the booklets and to
answer all the questions present in the booklet.

Since both the

high and low cognitive response conditions as well as the control
groups were present in the same room, subjects were informed that
.
there were several forms of the experiment going on at the same
time, and that some students would be asked to do different
,-

things.

Subjects were informed that if they completed their own

form of the test earlier than others, they should remain seated
and 4uiet in order to allow other students to finish their forms.
Also, in order.to obtain a time factor for the high cognitive response condition, a black check mark was placed on the eighth pag
of the booklet for

the~e

groups.

The subjects were told to raise

their hands when and if they came across the check mark, and the
experimenter would give these subjects further instructions at
that time.

This allowed the researchers to note the time require

for the subjects to give their cognitive response to the

--
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persuasive communication, and as the cognitive response sheets
were collected at this time, the-subjects could not use this shee
for responding to the recall questions asked later.

All subjects

were told that they were to read each page in the booklet in succession, and that once a page was completed, they were not to tu
back to that page, but always to move forward.

The experimenter

told the subjects to turn the booklets over and begin, and he
then took a desk in the back of the classroom and observed the
subjects.

When the experimenter observed that all subjects had

completed the booklet, he collected the forms, and he thanked
them all for participating in the experiment and proceeded to explain the true purpose of the experiment and the particular variables that were operating in the study.
were not stated.

The actual hypotheses

The subjects were allowed to ask questions and

to discuss the experiment with the researcher.

The subjects were

then informed of the reasons why all information concerning the
;'

study should
were urged

no~

t~

be revealed to other students, and the subjects

keep this information in confidence until May, 1971

No student admitted to having heard about the study before, although they had opportunity to do so without fear of penalty.
Materials
The materials consisted of a test booklet.
of the test booklet appears in the Appendix.

A complete copy

On the cover sheet

of the test booklet appeared a 250 word, objective, two-sided
account of a situation involving a small, poor town with a
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decreasing population which had been approached by a large ·company
which wished to build a factory and a research center in the town.
This account was given so as to give all the subjects a similar
initial attitude on the topic, generally in favor of the company
entering the town.
The second page consisted of experimental manipulations, as
described above.

There were eight variations of this paper ful-

filling the 2 x 2 x 2 design.
The third page consisted of the communicator's listing of
ten arguments advocating that the company should not be permitted
to move into the town.

These arguments were advocating a positioru

discrepant with the communication presented on the cover sheet.
These arguments covered such areas as pollution, crime, the
town's style of life and its future, traffic, outsiders moving in,
conservation of wildlife and natural resources.

These arguments,

the persuasive communication, were the same.for all eight experimental treatments.

One of the two control groups received this

communication in their test booklet.
The high cognitive response condition had a lined page following the third page upon which the subject's cognitive responses were to be written.
The following pages consisted of scales and ·questions comprising dependent measures.

The first of these pages included

four statements with instructions stating that the subject should
indicate his own personal opinion concerning the statement's trutl
.on a 15 point Likert scale.

The first two questions concerned thE
rnvn1 .4.
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subject's attitude towards the company moving into the town, the
other two questions centered on the subject's intensity and involvement concerning the issue.

The first attitude scale stated

"I fully encourage the town council to grant the company its request to move into the town."

This statement was intended to give

a direct measure of the subject's personal attitude on the specific issue.

This scale was used in an earlier study (Scileppi,

1971) and was found to correlate highly with the total attitude
and with other attitude scales.

The second attitude measure

stated uThe problems the company will cause in the town are very
great."

This scale was a less direct measure of attitudes, and,
although positively correlated to the first measure, 1 in the
earlier study, it tapped a slightly different source of variance.
In this case, the subject had to give a more cognitive.opinion,
with less affective significance, whereas the first statement was
more affective and behavioral,

The second statement did not force

the subject to take a position on the general issue; whereas the
first did require the subject to make a stand.
The third scale concerned the degree to which the subject
perceived his feelings on the issue to be intense.
stated uMy feelings on the issue are very intense."

The scale
This scale

was intended to shed light on the processes involved in
1The direction of the second scale.was opposite that of the
other three scales in order to serve as a check on response bias.
In the computations, the scores of the second measure were inverted so as to conform to the remaining attitude scales. All
correlations involving this measure refer to the inverted scores.

~attitude

..

t

35
change.

It was hypothesized that the manipulations such

as high involvement, would produce the critical evaluative sets in

i:•

r:

the subjects, and that 'the presence of these evaluative sets would

heighten the intensity of the subject's feelings.

In the absence

of physiological measures, it was hoped that a scale concerning

intensity of feeling would tap such a process.

In an earlier

pilot study, higher ratings of intensity were recorded in treatments which involved critical evaluative sets, particularly in the
treatment involving the high credible source as threat evaluative
set.
The fourth sentence on this page stated "I feel my position
on this issue is very important to me."

This statement was ad-

dressed to the same source of variance as the third scale, and was
included as an additional measure which should correlate with the
statement on intensity of feeling.

This scale had not been used

previously.
On the next page, for the high cognitive response groups

only, instructions were given to the subjects to rate their cognitive response in terms of the degree to which each response was
favorable to the position advocated by the persuasive communication on a +2 to -2 scale.

This method of self rating, according

to Greenwald (1968), has been highly reliable and· consistent with
other judge's ratings, and is a very feasible method of rating
subjective cognitive responses.

In the.pilot study, a slightly

altered form of the self rating scale was found to be highly
correlated to attitude scores, an indication of its validity.
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subjects were requested to place their rating index number to
left of each cognitive response.
The next page for all subjects included three more statement
which the subjects were requested to express their personal
,~,.

opinion.

The first scale concerned "What do you think of the com

pany moving into the town?"

This statement, on a 15 point favor-

able-unfavorable scale, was considered a more affective measure o
the subject's attitude on the entire issue.

As an evaluative

measure, it was meant to tap a similar source of variation as the
first attitude scale.

This statement was introduced in the

present study, and was expected to correlate highly with the firs
attitude scale.
The second statement on the same page concerned the subject'
degree of involvement in the issue.

This scale measured a dimen-

sion similar to the intensity and importance scales, and was used
as a third measure tapping the same source of variance in order t
observe the factor from a number of perspectives, and measure the
factor more reliably.

This dependent variable, the degree of in-

volvement, was chosen for a second reason, namely, to aid in determining the validity of the involvement manipulation.
The last question on this page asked "If you were a resident
of the town, how would.you view the company's request to enter th
town?"

The subjects were asked to respond on a

15 point scale

where 1 referred to "having all bad points" and 15, "having all
good points."

This attitude scale required the subject to take

the perspective of a resident of the town to make an evaluative
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judgment as a person whose future would be affected by the outcome
of the issue.

Thus this attitude scale, while tapping the same

general attitude dimensions as the other attitude scales, also included a unique aspect, involving the assumption by the subject of
the role of an interested person actually concerned with the
issue.
The next page consisted of two categories of questions.

The

first category, consisting of four questions, centered on the subject's ability to recall the main theme of the objective introductory communication, and of the involvement manipulation.

These

questions concerned the economic status of the town, the amount of
population decrease in the preceding two years, the method by
which the town council chose to resolve the issue, and the stated
purpose of the experiment.

The first three were considered useful

in determining whether a subject read the cover sheet, and had an
understanding of the material relevant to the study.

Correct re-

sponses would insure that the subjects grasped the town's plight,
and understood the reason why the town resident wrote the persuasive communication.

The fourth question centered on the subject's

understanding and recall of the involvement manipulation.

A

cor~

rect response, differentiating high from low involvement, indicated that the subjects at least were capable of forming the high
involvement critical evaluative set in the appropriate condition.
These four questions, with minor variations, were used in the
pilot study.

Over 90% of the subjects in that study responded

appropriately to all four, questions .•
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The second category of questions consisted of seven 9 point
bipolar scales concerned with the subject's perception of source
attributes.

Three of these scales measured more traditional

attributes such as trustworthiness, intelligence and competence.

The other four dealt with the subject's evaluation of the

source's position in this issue, his intent to persuade, the degree to which the source was active in the town, and the degree to

which the source appeared to be threatening.
a number of purposes.
source variable.

These scales served

First, they were manipulation checks on th

Second, they indicated possible source deroga-

tion due to the effects of the other two independent variables.
Certain individual scales were included in order to test specific
characteristics.

It was hoped, for example, that the existence o

a "high credible source as threat" evaluative set could be demonstrated by the bipolar scale concerning the attribution of
"threateningness" to the source by the

subject~

The scale con-

cerning the source's position on the issue was devised as a means
of determining the degree to which assimilation or contrast effect
were present in the subjects.

On the next page, the subjects were instructed to recall as
many of the arguments written by the town's residents as they
could.

The page

consi~ted

of these instructions and fifteen

blan~

lines which was considered sufficient space to write the full ten
arguments.

This task indicated the amount of recall of the per-

suasive communication.
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f.

The final page of the experimental booklet was designed to
provide further data on the student's interest and
ievel and also to complete the experiment.

involveme~t

The subjects were

asked to indicate how "hard" they tried on a 15 point scale.

This

scale was intentionally located after the subjects believed the .
. experiment was completed and was worded ·so as to incorporate the
· subject's feelings throughout the experiment, rather than how they
. felt about the particular position or issue.

It was considered

·that this scale would give an indirect measure of their interest
·and involvement, and that the measure should correlate with the
.three similar measures previously described (involvement, intensity, importance). 1
1 Thes-e four meas-u.r.es, and the ·scales measuring the attri bution to the source.of the quality of threatening, were included in
order to delve into the process of attitude change~ These measlll'es were intended to give an indication of the ·success of the experimental manipulations, and to show more directly the process
r.elating the dependent measures to the independent variables.
fhis was judged to be a better method than merely using the existence of the attitude change to confirm the existence of some hypothetical construct or intervening variable. The present practice
is necessary according to Singer {1966) in assessing the motivational outcome of the independent variables. Alternative intervening variables, representing different processes of attitude
change may be present, and may happen to have the same effe_cts for
the conditions tested as the hypothesized process. What is needed
according to Singer, is some direct checks on the process. Thus
in order for the hypothesized critical evaluative sets of the
present study to be confirmed, more than attitude change is required. The materials involved in this study attempted to include
direct measures of the evaluative sets. It should also be understood, however, that it is impossible to devise any checks on the
ralidity of the measures used, apart from face validity. Thus although some of these scales were used previously in the earlier
Pilot study, and found to be somewhat successful, negative or non~onfirmatory results of these measures do not necessarily indicate
the. non-existence of the hypothesized process, but the inadequacy
)f
the measures to tap or reflect that process •
.,,

I
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The other aspects of this final page included a promise of
silence, and a question devised to allow the student to explain
any previous information about the experiment.

Also, the subjects

were asked if they felt they were mistreated in any way by the
experimenter or as a result of particular aspects of the experimenter or as a result of particular aspects of the experiment.
The subjects then gave their name, age and year in college for
reference purposes.

r---------------------------------------------.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
In this chapter, the results of the experiment are discusse.d
in the following sequence.

First, the methods used in analyzing

the data will be discussed briefly.

Then the dependent measures

in relation to the experimental hypotheses will be elaborated
upon.

The results of the manipulation checks will be mentioned,

and finally, other resultss that is significant intercorrelations
among the dependent measures, and significant interactions found
in the dependent measures which were not predicted in the experimental hypotheses. will be discussed and elaborated upon.
Analysis
To test the various hypotheses of the study, the following
statistics were utilized•

(a) the analysis of the variance F

ratio was used for each of the eighteen dependent variables (four
attitude scales, four involvement measures, seven source evaluations and, for the high cognitive response groups only, one
measure of time and one cognitive response rating).

The eight

experimental treatments (or in the case of the cognitive response
and time measures, the four experimental treatments) were compare
for each dependent measure, and main effects, two way and three
41
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waY interactions among the three independent variables were
examined in terms of the experimental hypothesis.

(b) Since the

design also included two control groups, the Dunnett test (Edwards,
1968) was used to compare the control groups with each of the experimental groups for each of the eighteen dependent measures.
(c)

The Duncan New Multiple Range test (Edwards, 1968) was used

to determine the significance of the difference of the means among
the eight experimental treatments for each dependent measure.
(d)

The Pearson product moment correlation was also used to com-

pare dependent variables

me~suring

mining various intercorrelations.

similar factors and for deterDue to the large number of

correlations obtained and the possibility of probability loading,
it was considered necessary to determine levels of significance
from tables which took the number of the variables into account.
Such tables are found in Guilford (1965, pp. 580-81).

Finally

the .05 level of significance was chosen as the standard by which
to accept or reject the null hypothesis of this study.

However,

those comparisons of dependent variables or treatments which
reached the .10 level were reported as tendencies and for informational purposes.
Attitude Change
Hypotheses One, Two, Three, Four, and Nine are primarily concerned with the main dependent variable, attitude change.

The ---

measures making up this variable will be discussed, and then the
relationship between these measures and the relevant hypotheses.

--~
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The four attitude measures were intercorrelated.

The Pearson

' Product Moment Correlation Coefficients for the four attitude
: scales appear in Table l.

Each intercorrelation reached the .05
TABLE l

INTERCORRELATIONS AlVlONG THE FOUR ATTITUDE SCALES
AND THE COMBINED TOTAL ATTITUDE MEASUREa

l

.26

1
2
l~
~·

~'
~:

A:ttitude Measures
2b
3

3

4

Total

.62

.55

.80

.44

.33
.60

.68

4

.75

~·

,,.·
\

~

an = 152
p < .01,
variables)

.86

1:.

= .27

(from Guilford (1965). for 150

u.

four

bThe values of the second attitude measure are reversed to
conform to the direction of the other three measures.
level of significance, and all but one correlation, that between
the first and second attitude scale reached the .Ol level.

This

implies that there was a significant degree of overlap among the
four measures.

The range of correlation coefficients varied from

.26 for the first and second attitudes to .61 for the first and
third scales.

Due to these high positiye and significant inter-

correlations, the four attitude scales were combined into a total
attitude score by summing across the four scales.
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The 2X2X2 analyses of variance were computed for the total
and for the four separate attitude scales, and the results are
given in Table 2.
The first hypothesis predicted that low involvement would result in more attitude change than high involvement.

As can be

seen in Table 2, the F ratios for the separate attitude measures
and for the total.attitude combined measure were below or near
unity.

This indicates that none of the relevant differences were

significant, and that the hypothesis was not confirmed.

There

was no significant main effect due to involvement.
The mean attitude change of the treatments of the four separate attitude scales and of the combined measure (shown in Table
J) however, demonstrate that under low cognitive response, the

high involvement treatments were generally lower than the parallel
treatments under low involvement.

The same trend did not occur

under the high cognitive response condition,

sugg~sting

tial involvement by cognitive response interaction.

a poten-

Table 2 shows

that this interaction approached significance in the first, third,
and fourth measures.
the present study.

Thus, hypothesis one was not confirmed by
High cognitive responding caused the usual

involvement effect to disappear.

I
I

Hypothesis two predicted that source credibility effects
would appear only under low involvement.
volvement interaction was expected.

Thus a source by in-

The F ratio for this inter-

action was less than unity for all attitude measures.

There was

a slight tendency for the differences between parallel treatment

,

TABLE 2
2X2X2 ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF THE ATTITUDE MEASURES

Source of
Variation

H

Involvement (A)
Cognitive (B)
Response
Source (C)
Credibility

l

AX B
AX C
BX C

al2

< •01.

bl2 ~ • 05 t
cl2
Notes a

< .10,

4.8

l

75.3 8.Ja

l
l

1.9
24.5 2.7c
.6
44.1 4.5b
4.1

l.

1
l

AX BX C
Within ·

Attitude
#1
MS
F

144

9.9

Attitude
#2
MS
F
10.0 1.1

5.9
7.6
.2
.2
23.7 2.6
J.7
9.2

Attitude

#3
MS

F

6.7

Attitude
#4
MS
F

.6

Total Attit.
MS

F

81.l

1.2

11.1
174.8

2.6

55.7 7.Ja 18.5 4.4b
J.7
19.2 2o5
.6

.9
.9
7.6

= 1/144
511: = 1/144
,d!. = 1/144

sii

Only i•s greater than unity have been reported.
N = 152, with 19 Ss per cell.

.2
19.9 4.7b
.6
7.1 1.6
l.l
4.2

.8

210.5
5.5
68.4

J.lc

~
~t

~·',
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TABLE 3

'

SUMMARY OF lVlEANS a ATTITUDE SCALES

'S',.
t..
1··-~

Attitude Measures

1

2

3

4

High Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So,
Hi Inv Lo Cr So.
Lo Inv Hi Cr So.
Lo Inv Lo Cr So.

4.53
4;05
4.42
3.26

6.47
5.89
7.84
6.01

4.oo
3.32
3.42
J.32

6.42
5.79
5.58
5.21

21.42
19.05
21.26
17.84

Low Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So.
Hi Inv Lo Cr So.
Lo Inv Hi Cr So.
Lo Inv Lo Cr So.

4.42
5,37
5.26
6.84

6.53
6.79
6.95
7.53

4.26
4.05
5.42
5.16

5.79
6.37
6.74
6.89

21.00
22.58
24.37
26.42

Control Groups
One Message
Two Messages

3.32
5.94

6,38·
9.04

J.89
5.50

5,17
7.00

18.56
27.52

Treatments

Combined

.-

Notes

The higher the mean, the greater the attitude favorability
to the source's position.

means of the combined measure to increase under low involvement
relative to high involvement.

This tendency was not significant.

A graphic illustration of the treatment mean attitude ch/1ge of

the total attitude measure showing the extent of this tendency
appears in Figure 1.

The present study therefore failed to con-

firm the second hypothesis.

Attitude
More
Favorable
to Source's
Position

27.5

~~~----~~~~~~~~.....1.1•wo
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to Source's
Position
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Fig. 1.--Total Attitude Measure
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The third hypothesis predicted that the high credible source
will result in an attitude more favorable to the source's position
than the low credible source.

Thus a main effect was predicted.

In Table 2, the F ratio for this effect was less than one for all
attitude measures, and

th~refore

non-significant.

The treatment

means in Table J show that the high credible source produced more
attitude change than the low credible source for parallel treatments in the high cognitive response condition, but not for the
low cognitive response condition.

In the low cognitive response

condition, the low source tended to produce more attitude change
than the high credible source for parallel treatments.

This un-

usual set of findings will be discussed in the next chapter.

At

any rate, since there was no main source effect, hypothesis three

was not confirmed in the present study.
Hypothesis four predicted that less attitude change would
occur in the high cognitive response condition rather
than the
,.
cognitive response condition.

lo~

A main effect due to the cognitive

response expression facilitation was expected.

A significant main

effect due to the cognitive response was found for the total attitude measure (F = 7. 60, .df.

= 1/144;

l!

< . 01).

Significant main

effects for this variable were also found for the first, third
fourth attitude measures.

By inspection of the means (Table J)

the high cognitive response groups had less favorable attitudes
(to the source's position) than the meahs of low cognitive response groups for parallel treatments.

The Duncan New Multiple

.Range.Test (DNMRT) demonstrated that one set of parallel means

anc
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accounted for much of the significance of the differences.

This

test indicated that the low credible source, low involvement, low
cognitive response treatment had significantly greater attitude
change (p

< ,01)

than did the low credible source, low involvemen1

high cognitive response grpup,

As can be seen in Figure 1, the

differences between nearly every other set of parallel means for ·
the total attitude measure were in the predicted direction1 however. none was significant.
in the present study.

Thus, hypothesis four was confirmed

High cognitive response did produce signif-

icantly less attitude change than low cognitive response.
The next hypothesis dealing specifically with attitude change
was hypothesis nine.

It was predicted that less attitude change

would occur in the high rather than the low credible source treatment under the high involvement, high cognitive response conditio~I,
and not under any other condition.

It was expected that a three

way interaction would occur if this hypothesis had been confirmed.
From the analysis of variance results of Table 2, ·this
was not significant,

interactio~

Also, by inspection of the means in Table

J,

the mean attitude change for the high credible source in the
critical condition was actually larger in magnitude than the attitude change for the low credible source in the same condition.
This finding was in a direction contrary to the prediction of hypothesis nine.
measures.
study.

The tendency existed however for all the attitude

Thus hypothesis nine was not.confirmed by the present

This finding is significant since the confirmation of this

hypothesis would have demonstrated the existence of the high
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credible source as threat critical evaluative set.

A more com-

plete discussion of this finding.will be given in the next chapte •
gognitive Response Favorability Ratings
The cognitive response dependent variable was included in th
predictions of hypothesis nine, and the relationship between the
cognitive response measure and attitude change was relevant to
hypothesis five. 'Hypothesis nine predicted that the high credibl
source high involvement treatment would result in less favorable
cognitive responses than the low credible source, high involvemen
treatment.

Since the cognitive response ratings involved only th

high cognitive response condition, a 2X2 analysis of variance was
performed on the data.
Table 4.

The results of this analysis appear in

A source by involvement interaction was predicted in

hypothesis nine.

This interaction was significant (F

gr= 1/72, p <·05).

= 4.87,

By inspection of the means found in Table 5,

and by inspection of the graph of the cognitive response ratings
found in Figure 2, the direction of the interaction was contrary
to the prediction.

A DNMRT was performed on the cognitive re-

sponse favorability ratings.

The difference between the means of

the high and low credible source under high involvement was not
significant, but the difference between the means of the two
source treatments under low involvement was significant at the
level.

.o

That is the low credible source, low involvement treatmen

produced significantly more favorable cognitive response ratings
than the high credible source, low involvement group.

This also
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TABLE 4
2X2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE COGNITIVE
RESPONSE RATINGS, AND THE TIME MEASURE

df

Cognitive Response
MS
F

Time
MS

F

Involvement {A)

1

18.0

62.6

2.27

Source {B)

1

11.1

42.8

1.54

AX B·

l

156.3

Within

72

32.1

4.8?a

12.6

',.

al2 < .05, df.
Notes•

= 1/72

27.6

,.

Only F's greater than unity have been reported.

n = 76
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TABLE 5

SUMMARY OF MEANS 1 COGNITIVE RESPONSE
RATINGS, TIMEa AND RECALL

Treatment
High Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So.
Hi Inv Lo Cr So.
Lo Inv Hi Cr So.
Lo Inv Lo Cr So.

Cogn. Resp. b

Time

Recall

14.21
12.11
10.37

24.63

7.89
8.oo

14.oo

25.32
22.00
24.32

Low Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So.
Hi Inv Lo Cr So.
Lo Inv Hi Cr So.
Lo Inv Lo Cr So.
Control Group
Two Message
aCognitive response and Time measures given to High
Cognitive response groups only.
bHigh score indicates agreement with the persuasive
communication.

8.)2

8.32

7.05
6.63
6.Jl
6.11

s.44
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Fig. 2.--Cognitive Response Favorability Ratings
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was unexpected.

Thus the predictions concerning the cognitive

response favorability ratings of hypothesis nine were not con~-·

.•.

.

firmed.
Hypothesis five predicted that the cognitive response favorability ratings would be positively correlated to attitude change.
The Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients between the
attitude measures and the cognitive response favorability ratings
The coefficients ranged from .25 for the second

were calculated.

attitude measure and cognitive response to .47 for the third attitude scale.

The

~between

the total attitude measure and the cog-

nitive response ratings was .44.

The average

~.

for the relation-

ship between the attitude scales and the cognitive response favorability ratings, was ,37.
cance of the

~accounting

Using a conservative test for signififor the probability loading caused by

multiple intercorrelations, the average correlation with seventysix subjects in the high cognitive response condition and five
measures involved, was significant beyond the .05 level.

Thus the

relationship between cognitive response favorability ratings and
attitude change was significant.

Hypothesis five was confirmed i

the present study.
Source Ratings
Hypothesis eight was concerned with the dependent measure of
source evaluations.

The seven source evaluation measures were

intercorrelated to determine whether they were measuring the same
factor or not.

As expected, three measures, trustworthiness,
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intelligence, and competence, were most highly correlated.
~

correlations are given in Table 6.

These

These three measures are

TABLE 6
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE
SEVEN SOURCE EVALUATIONS

Trust. In tell. Compet. Active Threat Persuas. Position
Trust

.47

Intell.

.45

.JO

-.23

-.02

-.04

.62

.25

-.18

-.11

-.17

.JB

-.24

-.04

-.06

.11

.01

.02

.04

.04

Compet.
Active
Threat

.14

Persuas.
Position
Notes a

n

= 152

subjects
ll <: .05, r. = .28
p 4..

= .32

.01, x:

('

(for 150 gf, 7 variables)

typically used to describe source credibility.

The three were

combined to give an overall source evaluation measure.

Activity

correlated significantly with trustworthiness and competence
(r

= .30

and .JS, ll

with intelligence

< .05

(~

and ll

= .25).

<(

.01 respectively) but less so

Activity was not included in the

overall source rating measure as it was not a usual source credibility measure.

The other three measures will be treated

~

-

l

threat and position scales failed to reach significance, when a

~

probability loading factor was included.

56

individually.

pe~suade,

All intercorrelations among the intent to

to .14 for these three measures.
and the first three

sourc~

varied from .02

The correlations between threat

ratings (trustworthiness, intelligence,

and competence) were all marginally negative
-.24, respectively).

~·s

The

(~

= -.23,

-.18, and

This would indicate that there was a tendencr

to perceive a more threatening source as being less credible.
Hypothesis eight predicted that high cognitive response will
result in less favorable source ratings than the low cognitive
response cells.

Thus a main effect of cognitive response was ex-

pected to occur in the source evaluations.

A 2X2X2 analysis of

variance was performed on the source ratings and appears in Table
7.

The F ratios for this main effect in the in'telligence and com-

petence scales as well as in the combined source evaluation
measure were significant beyond the .Ol level.

In addition, the

scale concerning the evaluation of the source as threatening
showed a near significant F ratio (F = 2.8, .di
for the cognitive response main effect.

= 1/144,

p

< .10)

By inspection of the

means found in Table 8 the treatment means of the scales concerned
with source credibility (trustworthiness, competence and intelligence) were all in the predicted direction.

High· cognitive re-

sponse expression resulted in less favorable evaluation of the
source than low cognitive response.

Al~o,

Table 8 shows that the

treatment means of the threat scale were also in the predicted
direction.

Under high cognitive response, the source was viewed

"

"", -

"'·r~~~~''i,,

l!!IU

'If

II

,

I•

. '""l\I

TABLE 7
2X2X2 ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS1

'

Source of
Variation

Trust.
.Q.!. MS

F

Compet.
In tell.
MS
F MS
F

i+2+3

MS

F

Active
MS
F

Threat

!Ym

F

Involve·1
ment (A)
.8
.2
.8
.• 5
.3
.3
Cognitive (B)
Response
.11.1 2.aa
1 9.0 2.2 24.5 8.4a 11.1 4.lb 130.8 7.2a
3,5
Source (C)
Credibility 1 67.1 16.6a 17.1 5.9b 37.0 1J.8a 333.1 18.a 162. 55.2a 4.1
AX B
1
21.4
8.1 2.8
.5
1.5
1.9
29.5 7.6a
AX C
l
18.4
5.5 1.4 1.1
.5
13.J 4.5b
.5
5.jb
6.lb
B X C ..
1 21.4
26.1 9.0a
109.4
.5
9.0 J.lc 2.9
iA X B X C
1 3.5
4.8 1.6
7.2 2.7c 45.3 2.5
.6
6.J 2.2
Within
L44 4.1
18.1
2.9
2.7
2.9
3.9
1N = 152, with 19 Ss in each. treat~ent.
Only F's greater than unity were reported. The persuasive and position
scales analyses were not reported, since no F for these scales were greater than
one.
a
:R <: .01, gr_ = 1/144
b:R L.. .05, gt: = 1/144
c

:R

<

.10, Qt.= 1/144

~

-...:i

TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF MEANSs
Treatments

SOURCE EVALUATION MEASURES

Trust, Intell. Compet. Active Threat Persuasive Position

High Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So.
Hi Inv Lo Cr So,
Lo Inv Hi Cr So.
Lo Inv Lo Cr So,

4.74
4.84
5.15
3.89

4.oo
4.68
4.21
J.84

4.94
4.63
5.42
4.oo

6.74
6,16
8.05
·5,47

6.21
6.06
5,22
5,37

6.32
6.47
6,95
6.64

8.24
8.24
8,79
8,69

Low Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So.
Hi Inv Lo Cr So.
Lo Inv Hi Cr So.
Lo Inv Lo Cr So.

6.16
4.16
.6.21
4.05

5,53
J.84
5,95
4.63

5.84
4.42
5.84
5,05

8.16
5,79
a.21
5,47

4.43
4.90
5,27
6.oo

6.16
6.69
6.05
7.22

8.64
8.43
7,85
8.74

Control - 2 Message

4.44

4.89

5.22

6.56

5,56

5,78

7,00

Notes

The greater the number, the greater the degree of attribution to the
source of the particular quality.
Each Mean based on 19 subjects.

\J\
CX>
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threatening than under low cognitive response.

This point

,. will be elaborated upon in the next chapter, due to its importance

'·

:!.~

<:

to the critical evaluative set concept.

A DNMRT was performed on

the source ratings to determine which means accounted for this
~

main effect.

In the trustworthiness and intelligence scales, the

mean difference between two pairs of parallel means reached significance at the .05 level.

These were the high involvement, high

credible source, high and low cognitive response treatments, and
the low involvement, high credible source, high and low cognitive
response treatments.

The low credible source, low involvement

treatments followed the same pattern of differences, but the low
credible source high involvement cells did not.

Both of these

These
I
two effects were significant at the .10 level for the combined

latter effects were not significant for these two measures.
source evaluation measure, however.

For the threat scale, a DNMRT

was also performed •. The mean difference

be~ween

the high involve.-

ment high credible source, high and low cognitive response treatments was significant beyond the .05 level and the mean difference
between the high involvement, low credible source, high and low
cognitive response treatments was significant at the .10 level.
Other pairs of parallel treatment means tended slightly in the
opposite direction.
None of the other source evaluation scales (activity, persuasiveness, or the source's position) showed any significance main
effect due to the cognitive response independent variable.

These

,scales, however, had been considered as less important than the

0

credibility scales, in terms of the hypothesis. Thus hypo.
thesis eight was confirmed in the present study. The source
evaluations were significantly less favorable in the high cognitive response condition than in the low cognitive response condition.
~call

Measure

Hypothesis six was concerned with the recall measure, and the
predictions of hypothesis seven were concerned with the relation~

ship between recall and attitude change.

Hypothesis six

pr~dicted

that the amount of recall of the persuasive communication would be
significantly greater in the high cognitive response treatments

r· than in the low cognitive response groups.
L

A 2X2X2 analysis of

:--

~,,,_

..-.

variance was performed on the data obtained from the recall
measure.

This analysis appears in Table 9.

effect due to cognitive response appeared (F
p

L..

.001).

A significant main

= J8.6,

.si! = l/144a

Inspection of the means (Table 5) for recall shows

that the high cognitive response groups had higher recall than the
low cognitive response treatments.
recall data.

A DNMRT was performed on the

This test demonstrated that the difference between

all the pairs of parallel cell means were significant beyond the
.10 level except for the high involvement high credible source
high and low cognitive response treatments which approached the
.10 level of significance.

Thus the high cognitive response con-

dition did produce greater recall of the persuasive communication

1

TABLE 9

2X2X2 ANALYSIS -OF VARIANCE OF
THE RECALL MEASURE
~·~

... :

Source of Variation

'

.•

!'

~"~

'

MS

'

Involvement (A)

1

.6

Cognitive Response (B)

l

97,9

Source Credibility (C)

l

.6

AX B

1

9,5

AX C

1

.3

BX C

1

l.J

AX BX C

1

,2

144

2.5

I

Within
al2

~

.01, gr = 1/144

b

l2 <.. .10, gr.= 1/144

Note•

,.

n = 152

subjects

than the low cognitive response condition.

Hypothesis six was

confirmed in the present study,
Hypothesis seven predicted that there would be a significant
negative correlation between amount of recall and attitude change.
Evidence in the present study for this hypothesis came from two
findings.

First, bot.h hypotheses four

~d

six were confirmed.

Hypothesis four predicted that high cognitive response would produce less attitude change than low cognitive response, whereas
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hypothesis six predicted that high cognitive response would produce greater recall than low cognitive response.

The main effect

due to cognitive response in both attitude change and recall were
significant beyond the .01 level.

Thus this evidence points to an

inverse relationship between attitude change and recall.

Secondly

more direct evidence was obtained from the Pearson Product Correlation Coefficient relating the two variables.
tude scales and recall, the
average

~

~·s

For the four atti-

varied from -.24 to .OJ, with an

of -.15, for the total attitude scale and recall,

r = .18 1 , indicating that attitude change and recall are negativel
related.

Thus hypothesis seven tended to be confirmed in the

present study.
Manipulation Checks
In order to demonstrate that the

v~rious

hypotheses were con-

firmed due to the independent variable manipulation, and to investigate more deeply into the process of attitude change, it is
necessary to provide evidence that the manipulations were successfully performed.
1The significance level of this correlation coefficient is
open to interpretation. If the four attitude scales are considere
as a total attitude measure, and then compared to the one recall
measure, so that only two measures are being correlated, then the
relationship is significant at the .05 level. If the four attitude scales are separately correlated with recall, then the average ~does not quite reach significance at the .05 level, by a
·conservative probability estimate, taking into consideration the
probability loading of four correlations· (Guilford, 1965). The
present author opts for the former interpretation, since the four
scales when combined give a more comprehensive estimate of each
subject's attitude than the four measures taken separately.

6J
Source credibility.--A 2X2X2 analysis of variance was performed on the seven source evaluations, plus the combined trustworthy, intelligence-competence measure, and the results appear i
Table 7.

On the combined measure, a very significant source credi

bility main effect was noted (F

= 18.4;

M 1/144, 12 < .Ol).

This

effect was noted for each of the three source measures comprising
the measure and also for the active measure.

The magnitude of the

F in each case confirms that the source manipulation was successful.

Observing the means of each treatment of each measure in

Table 8 shows that the high credible source was evaluated more
favorably than the low credible source.

Thus the failure to ob-

tain a source main effect on the attitude measures cannot be due
to an· unsuccessful source manipulation.

More will be said con-

cerning this finding in the discussion section of the paper.
Ego involvement.--Four scales were incorporated into the experiment to measure this variable.

These four scales included the

intensity, importance, involvement, and "tried hard" measures.
These measures were all considered to .concern a common factor
involving an emotional aspect.

The four scales were intercorre-

lated and these results appear in Table 10.

Involvement, inten-

sity and importance correlated very highly, ranging from .62 to

.75.

These three were considered to be measuring a common factor,

and were combined into one measure.

The 2X2X2 analysis of vari-

ance were performed on the four original scales, and on the combined measure, but none of these five analysis produced
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TABLE 10
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE FOUR VARIABLES
OF INTENSITY, IMPORTANCE, INVOLVEMENT,
AND TRIED HARD

r.

Importance

Measures
Involvement
Intensity

.75

Importance
Involvement

Tried Hard

.62

.27

.68

.39
.26

Intensity
Tried Hard
Notes•

n

= 152

~

< .05,

.u ..(. • 01,

subjects
!:

= .23

I: = • 27

(for 150 g:_, four variables)

significant main effects or interactions.
ally significant interaction however.

There was one margin-

On the impoftance scale,

the involvement by cognitive response interaction nearly reached
significance (F = 3.57, U 1/144, l2 ..(_.OB).

By inspection of the

means, found in Table 11, this effect is due to a larger difference in importance between the high involvement and the low involvement treatments under the high cognitive response than the
low cognitive response condition.

A DNMRT test was performed,

which showed that this interaction was due
. largely to a signif icant difference (.u <.10) between the high and low involvement
condition of the high cognitive response condition for the low

'------------------------------~-------------------------------.
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TABLE 11
SUMMARY OF MEANS a EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT

'·

Measures
Import.
Involv.

Treatments

Intens.

High Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So.
Hi Inv Lo Cr So,
Lo Inv Hi Cr So.
Lo Inv Lo Cr So.

8.74
9.63
9.42
9.52

9,74
10.63
7.79
7,79

9.63
10.58
9.26
8.84

10.63
11.68
11.54
11.94

8.57
8.63
9.00
9,73

9.32
9.05
9,05
9.79

11.00
10.26
10.26
10.58

11.00
10.68
10.79
10.95

e.39
9.00

8.94.
8.94

9,26
10.11·

ll.00

• Low Cognitive Response
Hi Inv Hi Cr So,
Hi Inv Lo Cr So.
Lo Inv Hi Cr So,
Lo Inv Lo Cr So.

rt

Control Groups
One Message
Two Messages
Note a

Tried Hard

10,50

Each mean based on 19 subjects.

credible source.

Under the low cognitive response condition, the

two comparable means were not significantly different and the
direction of the difference was in the opposite direction (i.e.,
the low involvement treatment group rated the importance higher
than the high involvement group).

No

i~terpretation

was given to

this finding as there is a possibility that the cognitive response
by involvement interaction is spurious.

A probability level

r
t

{
~

f

p

<..

,08 could be expected by

c~ce,

given for

analyses, with

seven possible effects, were included in this section,
The two control groups rated the four scales in a manner
similar to the experimental treatments, and no significant differences were found when Dunnett tests were performed on these
measures.
As a partial manipulation check on the independent variable
of involvement which would bear direct relevance on these four
scales, a question was included on the recall page asking the sub
ject to state the purpose of the study.

Only seven out of 152

subjects failed to indicate the given purpose of the study, or a
reasonably close approximation of it.

This would indicate that

the involvement manipulation was at least comprehended by 95% of
the subjects, although the manipulation failed to affect the subjects differentially.
Cognitive response.--Since the cognitive response manipulation occurred in the directions given to the subjects, the only
direct check on this manipulation involved the manner in which th
directions were carried out.

Every subject in the high cognitive

response group wrote down cognitive responses, whereas none of th
remainder of the subjects did,
out correctly.

Thus the manipulation was carried

The results indicate that many dependent measures

were affected differentially by the two levels of this variable,
and these differences appear to be due solely to the subjects

making their cognitive responses to the persuasive communication
in the high cognitive response condition •
.Q._ther Results
The present study found a number of important relationships,
main effects and interactions which were not directly related to
the experimental hypotheses, but are worthy of mention as they
shed light on the process involved in attitude change.
Intercorrelations among the dependent measures.--After considering each measure category separately, it became important
also to demonstrate the interrelatedness between the categories of
attitudes, source evaluations, emotional involvement ratings, recall and cognitive response ratings.

These representative correla

tions are presented in Table 12.
Attitude favorability was found to correlate highly and positively with cognitive response favorability (r

~

;37) which indir

cates a close association and possibly even a process-product relationship between the two.

Attitude favorability was negatively

correlated to recall, indicating that retention and acceptance of
a persuasive communication are not at all directly interrelated.
Recall and cognitive response were also negatively related
(~

= -.26).

Attitude favorability and source favorability were

positively correlated, though not very highly

(~

= .13),

which is

consistent with the low F's obtained for source main effects in
the analysis of attitude measures.

Attitude and emotional involve

ment (relating to the four measures of intensity, importance,

TABLE 12

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
GROUPED IN CATEGORIES
Range of

Measures

r.

Attitude - source evaluation
ttitude
emotional involi•
~ttitude - cognitive resp.
ttitude - recall
· tti tude. - time*
ttitude - threat
Source evaluation - emotiin•
Source eval. - cog. resp.
Source eval. - recall
Source evaluation - time
Source evaluation - threat
ognit. Resp. - emotion. inv.*
ognitive response - recall*
~ognitive response - time*
ognitive response - threat*
ecall - emotional involve.
ecall - time*
ecall - threat
emotional involve.*
threat*
- emotional inv.
otesa

.02 to .22
to .07
.25 to .47
-.24 to .OJ
-.29 to .OJ
-.23 to .OJ
-.16 to .10
-.10 to .19
-.17 to .OJ
-.16 to -.25
-.11 to -.24
-.09 to .OJ

-.oa

-.26

.oo

- .. 27
-.16 to .16
-.10
.11
... 21 1;() ' .02

.13
.06 to .30

Average

r.
.lJ
-.02

.37

-.15
-.15
-.11
-.01

.06

-.08

-.20

-.19

-.04
-.26

.oo

Based on #
of Corr.
15
15
4
4
4
4
15
4
4
4
4
4
l
l

-.27

-.05

1
4

-.10
.11

l

-.06

1
4
l
4

.13
.24

n =·152, for each correlation. For those' correlations followed by
asterisk (*), n 76 (high cognitive response groups only were measured
n those scales).
The ~verage correlations were computed by the ! transformation
ethod of Guilford, 1965.

=

°'
Q)

involvement and tried hard) correlations were slightly negative,
as were emotional involvement and cognitive response favorability.
Both of these correlations, while very slight, were in the predicted direction.

That is, as involvement increased, attitude

'~· favorability to the communication's position decreased.

~··

Time taken did not correlate with cognitive response favora-·
bility ratings (i: =
~

but time correlated negatively with at-

titude favorability to a slight extent (i: = -.15).

r
~\

.oo),

negatively (I: = -.20) with source favorability, which might be

.

..~; interpreted through a low source evaluative set
ii

~
~"
~"

~.

Time correlatel

app~oach •

As the

subject feels less favorable towards the source, he tends to spend
more time evaluating the source's communication, more critically
studying it, and he tends to take longer writing his responses to
·that communication.
Threat correlated negatively w_i th attitude fa vora bili ty
(I:= -.11) and with cognitive response favorability (x:

= -.27)

which is consistent with an approach which views the process of
attitude change in terms of bolstering one's position and developing counter-arguments to resist persuasion when threatened.

Threa~

correlated positively with emotional involvement (x: = .24), which
is consistent with the approach of this paper,
negatively with source favorability (i:

= -.19)

Threat correlated
which would indi-

cate that the lower the evaluation of the source .bY the subject,
the greater the perceived threat.

This '.could be interpreted as

source derogation, due to threat, but other interpretations arJ
also equally plausible.
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Significant interactions found in the attitude measures.-Table 2 also shows a significant cognitive response by source interaction for the total attitude measure.
p < .10.)

(F

= 3.08,

gJ:,

= 1/144,

This interaction reached the .05 level of significance

for the first attitude scale and tended in the same direction, but

1

~·
r::

nonsignificantly for the other three scales.

Basically, this in-

~·.· teraction effect was due to a tendency for the high credible
~.

,•'.

',•

source to produce a more favorable attitude than the low credible
source under the high cognitive response conditions, whereas with
low cognitive response condition, the low source produced a
slightly more favorable attitude.
The involvement by cognitive response interaction reached
significance on the first and fourth attitude scales, but not on
the total attitude scale.

All attitude

scales·e~cept

the second

attitude measure showed the same tendency, namely, under the low
cognitive response condition, low ego involvement ,produced more
attitude change than high involvement, whereas, under high cognitive response a smaller trend in the opposite direction occurred.
Both the involvement by cognitive response and the cognitive
response by source interactions failed to produce any significant
differences between any two critical relevant treatment means,
when the DNMRT test was performed on the treatment means.
would imply that these interactions were due to

~he

This

combining of

two.means for each point of the two-way·interac\ion, and that the
effects are therefore general, and the variance 'is
not due solely
\
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to one treatment mean being significantly higher or lower than
the others.
The two message control group, incorporating both the objec•
tively worded first message and the discrepant persuasive second
message, without any source given or purpose of the study given,
produced a more favorable attitude toward the persuasive communication than any of the other treatments.

The mean of this contro

group, by the Dunnett test was significantly greater than the
means of only the high cognitive response, low source, high or lo
involvement treatments.

The one message control group, having

only the objectively worded message, produced a less favorable
attitude than all but the low involvement, high cognitive respons
low credible source treatment, by inspection of the means.

The

results of the Dunnett test showed that the one message control
group was significantly lower than the low involvement, low cogni
tive response, .low credible source treatment, and the two message
control group.

The four individual attitude scales show basicall

the same trends, and the same significant differences between the
control groups and the treatment means.

The data from all atti-

tude measures, with the exception of the third attitude scale
demonstrate a significant difference between the two control
groups, thus confirming that the inclusion of the persuasive communication (the second message) did produce an attitude significantly more favorable to the source ·than

~he

first message alone.
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Significant interactions present in the source evaluation

cases, tended in the opposite direction.
There was a marginal involvement by cognitive response interaction which appeared on the "intelligent" scale (F

!!!.

= 1/144,

p

<

.10).

= 2,?6,

This effect was due largely to an increase

in favorability in source evaluation from low involvement to high
involvement for the high cognitive response groups, whereas under
low cognitive response, the low involvement groups rated the
source more favorably than the high involvement subjects.
ti

The

threat" source scale showed also the same involvement by cogni-

tive res ,onse interaction but to a hi her level of significance
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(~

= 7.56,

Qi= 1/144, ~ L.•01).

Tha effect occurred in the same

direction as the "intelligent" scale.

Under high cognitive re-

sponse, the high involvement groups rated the source as more
threatening than the low involvement group, and under low cognitive response, the low involvement groups rated the source as more
threatening.
A DNMRT was performed on both these scales but no relevant
treatment mean difference reached significance.

Again, the inter-

action is due to the summation of two means for each point of the
interaction, and is not the result of one mean accounting for an
excessive amount of the variance.
Finally, there was a significant cognitive response by sourc
interaction present in the active scale (F
R ~. 05).

= 4.53,

g!,

= 1/144,

In this case, the interaction was due to a lessening ofl

source differences under high cognitive response conditions, relative to the low cognitive response condition.

The main reason fo

this lessening of source differences in the high cognitive response
condition concerned the two high involvement treatments only.
That is, the difference in evaluating the source as active, for
the high source relative to the low source under the high involve
ment high cognitive response condition was relatively small,
whereas the differences between the .high and low source for the
low involvement high cognitive response group and the high or low
involvement low cognitive response
greater (12 <: • 05 - DNMRT).

grou~s

were significantly

7

The persuasive and sources• position scales produced no significant main effects or interaction, and no further analysis was
performed on these scales.
The two message control groups included the same source evalu;
ation scales, but without an identified source.

That is, the sub-

jects were asked to rate the sources only on the basis of the communication which was attributed to an unidentified source.

On the

first five source evaluation scales (trust, intelligent, competent:,
active and threat), the control groups rated the unidentified
source less favorably than the high credible source groups and more
favorably than the low credible source groups.

That is, the mean

source evaluation of the control group for these scales fell in
between the marginal means of the groups receiving a high crediblel
or a low credible source biography.

On the remaining two scales,

the control groups rated the source as less persuasive and as
having a more moderate position than either the high or low cred,.

ible source.
It is interesting to note that in the two scales (intelligent
and competent) in which the cognitive response variable main ef:fec
was highly significant, the control group rated the source in a
manner more similar to the low cognitive response group than to
the high cognitive response group.

This lends some support to the

prediction that under high cognitive response conditions, the
source will be devalued relative to· the
groups.

~ow

cognitive response
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Significant interactions appearing in the recall mea§ure.--A
2x2x2 analysis of variance was performed on the recall data.

In

addition to the previously mentioned main effect due to cognitive
response, a near significant involvement by cognitive response in

i

teraction was present (F

= J.75,

.Qi= 1/144, p

< .08).

In the

~,

high cognitive response group, low involvement produced a greater
amount of recall than high involvement, whereas under low cognitive response, high involvement produced a larger recall score
than low involvement.

Again the direction of this interaction is

exactly the reverse of that demonstrated in the attitude measures.
By inspection of the treatment means (Table 5) for recall, this
interaction was not due to any one specific treatment mean accounting for the variance, but was due to the combination of all
relevant means taken together.
Time.--The last dependent variable to be considered was a
time measure.

This measure applies only to the high response

groups, and represents the time from the beginning of the experiment to the completion of the final at.ti tude scale.

It was as-

sumed that the largest part of the variability in this measure
would be due to the time taken to write the cognitive responses.
If the measure showed significant main or interaction effects,
these could be interpre.ted as indicating that the cognitive response manipulation was not consistent or constant for all and
that those who took longer or shorter to write responses could be
considered as separate treatments, subject selected and controlled,,

• which would jeopardize the standardization and interpretation of
t•

the variables.

One could ask in ·such a situation, was the effect

due to the independent predetermined variables, or was it due to a
time factor.
,.

That is, are the resulting differences ·1n time merely

random effects, irrelevant to the independent and dependent variables?

To answer these questions, a 2X2 analysis of variance was

performed on the h.igh cognitive response groups {the only group
whose times were recorded), and the results of this analysis indicated that no main effects or interactions were found to be signi-

= 2.27,

< .15, for involvement>.
The treatment means for this time measure appears in Table 5.
ficant {largest F

df = 1/76, p

In conclusion, the analysis of the data of this present

stud~

indicated that hypotheses one, two, three and nine were not confirmed but hypotheses four, five, six, seven and eight were confirmed.

..

I
I
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
F.

: · ......Critical Evaluative Sets and j;he Hypotheses
',_

The purpose of this research was to delve more deeply into
the process of attitude change, and to demonstrate the existence
of four critical evaluative sets which cause the subject to view
the persuasive communication from a more critical perspective.
Thes~

critical evaluative sets cause the subject to place the

position of the persuasive communication in his latitude of rejection, and therefore, less attitude change results.

The four

· critical evaluative sets are high ego invo1vernent, low source
credibility-, high cognitive responding, and in .a particular condi.tio~,

the high credible source as threat. ·The hypotheses of the

study were proposed as tests of the validity of these critical
evaluative sets.
High ego involvement critical evaluative set.--The first hypothesis concerns the high ego involvement critical evaluative set.
The differences in attitude change between high and low involvement, summed over the source credibility and cognitive response
conditions while in the predicted direction, was not statistically
significant.

This is an unexpected finding.
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Two previous

r

studies - Scileppi. (1971) using?: nearly identical involvement

~·

1:

i

manipulation, and Johnson and Scileppi (1969) using a similar
manipulat!on - found the expected involvement main effects.

How-

ever, in the present study, since hypothesis one was not confirmed,,
the high involvement critical evaluative set was not demonstrated.
Reasons for this failure to confirm will be given later in this
chapter.
Low credible source evaluative set.--The third hypothesis was
concerned with the low credible source evaluative set.
sis of the data failed to confirm this hypothesis.

The analy-

The difference

in attitude change between the high and low credible source,
summed over all levels of the involvement and cognitive response
variable was not statistically significant.

The lack of confirma-

tion of this hypothesis is surprising, since the vast majority of
research involving source credibility has demonstrated that the
low credible source produces less attitude c·hange ·than the high
credible source.

In the pilot study of the present research

(Scileppi, 1971), a source credibility main effect had been found,
which gave credence to the low credible source critical evaluative
set concept.

In the present research, however, since the third

hypothesis had not been confirmed, the low credible source evalua
tive set had not been demonstrated.

The reasons for the failure

to confirm the existence of this set will be discussed later in
this chapter.
As was previously mentioned, the low source credibility and·

r

r
f~·

high involvement critical evalu::ive sets were thought to be re-

lated in a non-additive manner.

That is, if one critical evalua-

tive set was present, the presence of the other would not lower
attitude change any further.

Thus either set acted to produce a

threshold in an all-or-nothing situation.
tested in hypothesis two.
expected.

This relationship was

A source by involvement interaction was

This interaction was highly significant (F

fil'.. = 1/136;

l! ~ .01) in the Scileppi (1971) study.

= 8.35,

In the present

study, this interaction was not significant and from the graph of
the total attitude measure (Figure 1), nothing similar to the predicted interaction appeared.

Thus this hypothesis was not con-

firmed, and the predicted relationship between the two critical
evaluative sets was not demonstrated.

The reasons for this

appear to be contained in the reasons given for the failure of the
two critical evaluative sets taken separately.

If the two critica

evaluative sets did not produce the desired results, then the in.-

teraction between the two would also be ineffective in producing
the predicted effects.

'
High cognitive response evaluative set.--The fourth hypothesi
was concerned with the high cognitive response critical evaluative
set.

Thus a main effect due to cognitive response was expected

such that less attitude· change would occur under high cognitive
response condition rather than under low cognitive response.

The

results of the present study confirmed the prediction of the hypothesis.

The difference in attitude change between high and low
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cognitive response, summed over the involvement and source.credibility conditions, was statisticaily significant at the .01 level,
and in the predicted direction.

Thus the hypothesis was confirmed,

and the high cognitive response critical evaluative set was demon
strated in the present study.
It was also expected that high cognitive response would not
only decrease attitude change, but would also cause the subjects
in this condition to derogate the source.

Thus the high cognitivei

response critical evaluative set would also affect the source
ratings.

This was the prediction of hypothesis eight.

The analy-

sis of the results of this study indicate a significant main effec
of cognitive response in the combined source evaluation ratings.
The difference in the source evaluation ratings between the high
and low cognitive response treatments, summed over involvement an
source credibility were statistically significant, and in the predicted direction.

Thus hypothesis eight was confirmed, and anothe
r

effect of the cognitive response critical evaluative set was
demonstrated.
High credible source as threat critical evaluative set.--The
author's main purpose in preparing this research was to investigate the high credible source as threat critical evaluative set.
The conditions for the ·existence of this set were carefully considered.

It was believed that

giv~n

the high involvement set, the

subjects would be motivated to critically evaluate the material.
Then, if the subjects were instructed to write down their response'

~

~·
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to the persuasive communication, they would be better able to
elaborate upon their more critica1 responses, and to convince
themselves of the validity of their own arguments.

Furthermore,

with these two critical evaluative sets established, the subjects
would view the author of the persuasive communication as an opponent, proposing a view discrepant from their own.
tion would result.

A debate situa-

If the author of the persuasive communication

was considered to be a strong opponent, then the subject, already
motivated to defend his own position, would view the high credible
source as a greater threat, and therefore become more concerried to
maintain his initial stand on the issue.

Furthermore, the subject

in this situation is likely to see the position of the source to
be more discrepant from his own position than it actually is, and
some polarization might occur.

This might

a~tually

cause a mild

source boomerang effect to be present, such that the subject would
develop an attitude less favorable to the

sourc~•s

..

position than

his initial attitude (after reading only the objective message).
Thus the high credible source as threat critical evaluative set
was expected to produce an even less favorable attitude than the
low credible source evaluative set, in this particular condition.
Hypothesis nine tested this prediction.

A three-way interac-

tion was expected, in which the high credible source, high

involve~

ment, high cognitive response treatment would result in less attitude change than the low source in
than all other conditions.
confirm this hypothesis.

a

parallel condition, and lower

The results of this experiment did no1
The three-way interaction did not

__________
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r
~·

approach significance.

---r

The mean attitude change of the critical

treatment was actually greater than that of the low credible source
in the parallel treatment.

Thus the results of this experiment

did not demonstrate the existence of the high credible source as
threat critical evaluative set.
ing.

This again is a surprising find-

The pilot study demonstrated a near significant three-way

interaction, with the mean attitude change in the critical condition smaller than that for every other treatment.

Reasons for the

failure of this present study to demonstrate the existence of this
critical evaluative set will be given later in the paper.
Thus, the high cognitive response critical evaluative set was
demonstrated in the present experiment, whereas the low credible
source, high involvement, and high credible source as threat
critical evaluative sets were not demonstrated.

In the following section, the relationship between the analysis of the data and the hypotheses of the study wfll be demonstrated, and compared with a previous pilot study involving the
same variables.
.

Reasons for the failure in some cases to demon-

strate the hypotheses, and potentially successful lines for future
research will be discussed.

The results in terms of the two main

approaches of the study will be discussed.
The first hypothesis predicted that there would be a main
effect due to ego involvement, such

tha~

low involvement would

produce a more favorable attitude than high involvement.
hypothesis was not confirmed.

This

This result is surprising, in view

of the fact that the pilot study demonstrated a very significant

BJ
main effect due to involvement, and in the proper direction.

The

involvement manipulation was nearly identical to the earlier study.

rt

Only apparently minor phrases were changed, while the meaning of
the content of the passage was retained in toto.
ference involves the histqrical circumstances.
was conducted in the Fall semester, 1970.

One possible difThe pilot study

The subjects, coming to

the sessions of the first study, were being constantly bombarded
with political campaigning for the November elections.

Two stu-

dents at Loyola University of Chicago were running for local alder.manic positions.

Many students were greatly involved in political

action, but were unable to vote because of

t~eir

age.

Also, stu-

dent sentiment was high on the age of voting issue, as the Illinois
Constitution referendum vote on this issue occurred in early Fall,
and the twenty-one year old age limit was retained.

The involve-

ment manipulation made salient the relationship between the actual
voting age requirement and the pilot study.
~

By the second semester, however, when the present study was
undertaken, interest in politics sagged, and no elections were
forthcoming.

The procedures for amending the Federal Constitution

regarding the decrease in the age requirement were well under way,
and as the issue was swiftly being resolved in favor of youth, interest and discussions declined greatly.

Thus as the issue was no

longer as important as before, and the manipulation relating the
issue to the experiment was not as fruitful as it had previously
been.

The fact that the manipulation was comprehended and re-

tained was not at issue.

Over 95% of the subjects recalled the
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study in the Fall of 1969, research was undertaken which involved
fictitious miracle food supplement named REMOH, which, according
to the invented description, would alleviate hunger, but as of the
time of writing, was still experimental in nature, and required
further testing.

Midway through this carefully planned research,

the Food and Drug Administration banned cyclamates.from the public
market, as insufficient research had been performed on the drug.
In the succeeding sessions of the experiment, the subject's attitude toward REMOH became erratic, and the data was uninterpretable
The second hypothesis predicted a source by involvement interaction, under low cognitive response, such that the high credible source would produce a more favorable attitude under low ego
involvement, but not under high involvement.
experiment did not confirm this hypothesis.
mation is also surprising.

The results of this
This lack of confir-

Scileppi (1971) reported a highly sig-

nificant source, by involvement effect, as did other researchers

L
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previously.

Again, very little was modified, and, with the excep-

tion of the change in historical circumstances mentioned previous
none of the modifications could have been responsible for the interaction to disappear.

At this point, the best explanation would

include the difficulties in the involvement manipulation, mentione
above.

Yet this is not entirely satisfactory, as those diffi-

culties cannot explain why the low involvement condition produced
negative source differences (i.e., the low credible source tended

l to produce a more favorable attitude than the high credible
f.

!
'

source) instead of an increase or spreading apart of the usual
source differences.
pulation as well.

The problem may also lie in the source maniThe problem will be discussed in terms of the

third hypothesis mentioned below.
The third hypothesis predicted that the high credible source
would produce a more favorable attitude than the low credible
source.

Again-this experiment failed to confirm this prediction,

although the pilot study produced a near significant main effect
due to source credibility.
itself was not at fault.

The source credibility manipulation
The subjects differentiated the high an

low credible source on such scales as trustworthy, intelligent,
competent, and active, at the .05 level of significance or better,
as the subjects in the pilot study had done on similar scales.
Either the subjects of the present study dissociated the source
from the communication, or other factors were present which cause
the subjects not to regard the source biography when rating their
opinions concerning the message.

These factors might include

'

r-~--------------------~8~6----------------------_,
demand characteristics, or a decrease in the plausibility of the
manipulation, or of the experiment as a whole.

The wording of the

source manipulation was basically the same as in the pilot study.
Demand characteristics should have been basically the· same in the
two studies.

One minor difference which may have affected demand

characteristics appeared in the low credible source biography.

A

section was added in order to strengthen the low source's bad
qualities, which may have actually produced the opposite effect.
The sentence stated that the individual who wrote the cornmunication had run unsuccessfully for a small public office in another
state, and apparently others in that locality had not placed much
trust or confidence in him.

Some subjects.may have perceived that

the manipulatton was intending to produce sympathy .,for the source,.
rather than a lower evaluation.
such a statement.

The pilot study did not include

Also, there may have been a certain amount of

incredulity on the part of some subjects due to. the same low credibie source biography.

The subjects were informed that a

particula~

town resident wrote the persuasive communication as a letter to a
local newspaper, and that the source biography was included in
that letter.

Some subjects may have wondered why the source would

include such information about himself, and his unsuccessful political career and the ill-feeling directed him at his former
residence.

It could be inferred from the source biography that

the source wished to escape that publicily, and that he therefore
recently moved,

Some subjects may have questioned why the author

would want to print this information in the local newspaper.

The
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subjects may have seen this as implausible, and perceived that
theY were being "taken•'' and that· there were other more personal
variables under investigation in the present study.

This one

statement in the source biography was meant to increase the source·
differences, but it may have caused new factors to exist in the
eyes of the subject, which would partially explain the higher
variability in their responses to the attitude scales.
A possible reason for the apparent failure of both the source

and involvement manipulation to produce the desired effect, and
for the failure to replicate the same effects of these variables
present in the pilot study may have been a slight modification in
the procedure.

In the pilot study, the low and high cognitive

response conditions were performed separately.

This procedure was

undertaken since there was a noticeable difference in the time
needed to complete the separate conditions, and if both groups
were present in the same session, the low cognitive. response subjects would possibly wonder what the others were doing, and why
they were taking longer, and if there were pages missing in their
own experimental booklets.
ticeable flaws.

This procedure, however, had two no-

The subjects were not fully randomized, as in an

given session, the booklets for only half the treatments were
present; and also, the experimenter knew which condition - high o
low cognitive response - was being given to the subjects, and the
researcher's own bias (Rosenthal, 1966) could in.fluence the subjects' results.

This was a particular problem, as slightly diffe

ent instructions were given to the subjects in the high cognitive

r
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f. ·

response group.

Namely, the subjects in the high cognitive re-

sponse groups were asked to raise their hand when they came across
a check mark in the booklet, and at that· time the researcher would
take their cognitive response page, and mark the time.

In the

lo~

cognitive response sessions, these instructions were not given,
and different subtle and unconscious cues may have been given to
the two groups separately, and in a manner producing the hypothesized results.

The fact that the pilot study did produce cogni-

tive response main effects and certain interaction effects would
be consistent with this interpretation, and to eliminate this confounding factor, as well as the flaws mentioned previously, the
present study had both conditions present in the same session.

In

order to have both groups present, the subjects in the present
study were informed that there were various forms of

the.experimen~ 1

and that others in the room would be doing slightly different
tasks.

This may have created an "experimental

se~,"

that is, the

subjects were "keyed" to the study as a psychological experiment,
and this set may have decreased the plausibility of the high involvement purpose of the study,

In the first study, the subjects

were more able to believe that this study was sponsored by a
Federal agency concerned with voting requirements.

In the preseni

study, this may have been less believable, and many subjects may
have doubted its authenticity.

All other aspects of the procedure

of the present study remained unchanged' from the pilot study.

The

experimenter was the same throughout all sessions, and was dressec
.in the.same manner.
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The fourth hypothesis predicted that the low cognitive re.
sponse groups would produce a more favorable attitude than the
high cognitive response group.

This hypothesis was definitely

confirmed in the present experiment.

This fact discounted the

possibility that the main effect of cognitive response found in
the pilot study was due to an experimenter bias effect or artifact.
The results of this experiment support the concept that cognitive
response expression facilitation does act as a critical evaluative
set.

Requesting that an individual respond in writing to each of

a list of arguments discrepant with his original position does appear to help motivate the person to rehearse and develop his arguments to a greater extent than if the person merely read the arguments.

The fact that the high cognitive re.sponse condition did

result in an attitude less favorable to the source than the low
cognitive response group also indicates that the subjects became
more critical of the persuasive communication as a.. result of
writing his responses.

More support for this concept of high cog-

nitive response as critical evaluative set will be discussed when
considering hypotheses five, six and eight.
Hypothesis five predicted that the cognitive response favora
bility ratings would correlate positively with attitude favorability.

The results of this study confirm this hypothesis.

The

average correlation between the cognitive favorability ratings an
attitude favorability was positive, and "significant beyond the
level.

.o

This finding gives further support to Greenwald's (1968)

theory relating cognitive.responses to attitude.

The

relationsh~~
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can be interpreted as a process-product relationship; that is, th
~

(

cognitive responses of the subject helped to determine the subject's attitude on the issue.
In considering the process-product relationship, the stochas
tic model, as proposed by

~ocial

learning theory, is relevant.

McGuire (1968), using this model, considers that the attitude for
mation process can be broken down into two basic categories comprehension-retention and acceptance.
measure involved the first category.

In this study, the recal

This measure will be de-

scribed below, in hypotheses six and seven.

These cognitive re-

sponse ratings, however, can be considered as a reasonable measur ·
of the acceptance factor of the attitude change process.

The hig

positive relationship between cognitive response and attitude can
be seen therefore as demonstrating a potentially causal relationship between the two variables.
The cognitive response ratings are interesting for another
reason.

They are both self-generated in part, and yet, they are

also the result of the independent variable manipulation, and the
arguments contained in the persuasive communication, which are
treatment induced.

For example, the pilot study demonstrated tha

in the analysis of these ratings, a main effect due to involvement
was found, and in the present study, a significant source by involvement interaction was reported.

Cognitive responses can be

seen, therefore, as both an independent variable, and a mediating
variable, affected by other independent variables.

Greenwald has

concentrated on cognitive responses as an independent variable,
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r
~·

whereas the present researcher has discussed these responses from

'

both perspectives.

r

~-

!·.

A point could be made here concerning the potential interaction or association between the act of rating the cognitive responses and then the subjects responding to the attitude scales.
In other words, is the high correlation between the cognitive responses and attitude due to a consistency in rating, or is it due
to the cognitive responses and real attitudes.

Bern (1965, 1967)

would possibly interpret the results in terms of his self-persuasion model.

That is, a subject makes his cognitive responses to

the communication, and then rates them.

He may then feel that if

he rated his cognitive responses in such a way, then that rating
must have been his attitude toward the issue.

The present study

attempted to demonstrate that this is not the case since the sub.
ject first wrote his cognitive responses, then rated two attitude
scales, then rated his cognitive responses, and finally, complete
~

two additional attitude scales.

Since there were high positive

correlations between the first two and the last two attitude
measures, the rating of the cognitive responses itself could not
have greatly influenced the attitude ratings per se, but it is a
plausible position to state that the first two attitude scale
ratings could have influenced both the cognitive response ratings
and the last two attitude measures.

To answer this argument in

future research, it would be necessary to.have the cognitive response ratings rated by independent judges, rather than by the
subjects themselves.

This had not been previously done, since
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Greenwald {1968) reported a very high correlation between self
ratings and the judge's· rating of these cognitive responses, and
the real problem had not been perceived clearly,

Perhaps, howeverr

to fully dismiss the possible objections of Bem and others, rating
of the cognitive responses by independent judges only should be .
performed.
The sixth hypothesis predicted that there would be a significant main effect of cognitive response on recall, with high cognitive response groups having greater recall than the low cognitive
response groups.
present study.

This hypothesis was definitely confirmed in the
This would imply that while writing cognitive re-

I

sponses decreased favorable attitude change, it also had the effect

of increasing the retention of the persuasive communication.

It

would be interesting in future research, to explore the persistence
of resisting persuasion.

A subject who is encouraged to cogni-

tively respond or to counterargue in writing has to consider both
sides thoroughly.

He actively understands, retains, and then re-

jects the opposing position, rather than passively discounting it.
Perhaps, in time, when similar arguments are presented, this active
rejection will produce in the subject a greater degree of confidence in his own position, and he will fee1·1ess inclined to be
swayed by new arguments.

This has some similarities to McGuire's

Innoculation principle {1964), but it differs
in the fact that the
.
resistance to future persuasion will result from the encouragemen1
to counterargue from the cognitive response process itself.

Such

a confirmation in future research would have many practical as

I
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well as theoretical consequences and applications.
The seventh hypothesis predicted that attitude change would
be negatively correlated with recall.
confirmed.

The hypothesis tended to be

Thus recall per se is a poor indicator of· attitude

change, and as the study predicted and confirmed, the relationship
between the two tends to be negative, at least in this case.

In

terms of McGuire's model, retention is by far a less significant
component of attitude than is acceptance.

In his stochastic

model, recall of material is only seen as a necessary but not sufficient factor in attitude formation; that is, once a certain
level of retention is reached, recall becomes less important in
determining attitude formation and change.

The negative relation-

ship that was found in the present study could be due to the fact
that all subjects reached at least this necessary level of retention of the persuasive communication for understanding to take
place.

It appears that the subjects went far beyond this minimal

level.
As the subject more fully understood the communication, the
more able he was to counterargue against it, and he was less affected by the communication.

To further clarify the process of

cognitive responding in the relationship between recall and attitude change, cognitive response ratings correlated -.26 with recall and +.37 with attitude favorability.
titude favorability.

Thus the process of at-

Thus the process o1 attitude change is more

dependent on acceptance, as viewed by the cognitive response ratings than upon retention, as measured by recall.

Thus, it is

r----------------------------~----------------------------,
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possible for a negative relationship to exist between retention
and attitude change, particularly if more than a minimal level of
retention necessary for understanding is attained by most subjects.
To further demonstrate the importance of the cognitive response variable in the process of evaluating the communicator as
well as the communication, the eighth hypothesis predicted that
there would be a main effect of cognitive response on the subject's analysis of the source, such that, under low cognitive response, the subject would view the source more favorably than
under high cognitive response.

This hypothesis was also

confirmed~

This indicates that as the individual cognitively responded (and
since all the subjects tended to oppose the persuasive communication), or counterargued against the communication, he tended to
devalue the author of the communication.

Thus, not only did he

show a less favorable attitude toward the position of the communication, but he also derogated the source.

If the process of atti-

tude formation and change were seen analagously as a pressure
model, it could be inferred that as the pressure or the motivation
to reject the communication increases, this pressure can be
channeled or relieved in at least two directions, source derogation and resistance to persuasion.

Furthermore, the variable of

cognitive response affects both channels in the same manner.

This

pressure model analogy could shed light on the many failures of
manipulations to produce attitude changes, in this study as well
as others.

Possibly, if all other channels were defined and

measured, and then possibly covaried, better studies of attitude
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Steiner and Johnson (1964) using a
.
similar model in a cognitive dissonance study had produced results
change process would occur.

compatible with this reasoning.
The ninth hypothesis predicted that there would ·be less
favorable attitude and less favorable cognitive response ratings
for the high credible source, high ego involvement, high cognitive
response treatment than for the low credible source under the same
conditions.

This hypothesis is based on the concept that the high

source in this condition would be viewed as a threat.

Although

there was a slightly greater evaluation of the source as threatening in the relevant high credible source treatment than in the

lo~

source condition, both the attitude favorability and cognitive response ratings between the two relevant statements were in the
wrong direction.

Thus, the hypothesis was not confirmed.

The

reason for the failure to demonstrate the validity of this high
source as threat set concept probably lies in the r failure to suecessfully achieve the high involvement effect, and the correct
source credibility manipulation differences, as mentioned previously.

It is interesting to note that in the pilot study, the at-

titude favorability differences were in the correct direction, although not significantly, and a modification in the involvement
and source manipulation were included in order to heighten this
effect.
It is interesting to note that in the cognitive response
rating, the high credible source, low involvement treatment resulted in.a less favorable rating that the low credible source in
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the same condition, and that this difference was significant beyond the .05 level of the DNMRT.

Perhaps the reasoning for this

concept is correct, but the relevant conditions for its manifestation are wrong.

In other words, perhaps the high source is seen

as a threat, and in a high cognitive response expression condition;,
the subject is motivated to cognitively respond to degrade the
source's position, but that high involvement as manipulated, may
confuse the subject who is interested more in making a correct and
intelligent decision, and in this situation he may be swayed more
by the high credible source.
More research needs to be performed here, and other factors
may be involved before the specific conditions for this set are
determined.

At this point, the only statement that can be made is

I

that the results of this study have failed to confirm this hypothesis, and that the specific conditions did not produce the predicted results needed to demonstrate the existence of this set.
~

Thus, because of the flaws of this experiment, and the failure
to achieve the desired source and involvement effects on attitude
change, little light can be shed concerning the social judgment
approach to attitudes.

The pilot study and the Johnson and

Scileppi (1969) study can be readily interpreted as supporting
this approach, and the

~valuative

set concepts consistent with the

approach, as described in the introduction of this paper.

Possi-

ble reasons for the failure of the study to support the approach
have been given, along with suggested solutions.
The researcher has a belief. that the approach will be

~f'

verified when better experiments are devised, which will occur as
the result of the experience

gain~d

by conducting experiments sue

as the present one.
Greenwald's cognitive response approach to attitude formatio
and change has been utilized successfully in this study.

The hig

cognitive response as a critical evaluative set concept has been
found useful in interpreting the results of this study.
Future lines of research studying this concept as an independent as well as a mediating variable would prove fruitful in
the understanding of the attitude formation·and change process.
Also, it appears to be imperative to develop better means of
measuring and analyzing the emotional involvement - intensity
states of the subject, if research delving into the process of
attitude change relevant to evaluative sets is to be successful.
It is the belief of the present author that such research needs t
be performed to clarify the processes which produce the attitude
change.
Finally, research demonstrating that such factors as perceptual sets and cognitive responding are significant determinants o
attitude change has ramifications extending into the realm of
philosophical psychology.

These factors give credence to the vie

of man as an active organism.

Research on perceptual sets indi-

cates that the orientation a person establishes towards a stimulu
will affect his response to that stimulus.
.

Also, research on cog

nitive responding demonstrates that a person does not passively
accept new information, but actively processes it, and contrasts

~~

the new information with previous information in his cognitive
system.

The present researcher believes that the stimulus - re-

sponse model of social psychological research is inadequate in th
study of attitude change, and that a more phenomenological stimulus ·- organism - response model, with a heavy emphasis on the
active organism, offers the promise of a more comprehensive grasp
of the field.

APPENDIX
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A certain large company wishes to establish a rectory and a research
center in a certain small town, in a rural area of the state. The town is a
poor town, as over half its citizens are in the lowest socio-economic claes.
'.rhe town 1 s population has been dwindling slowly, from over 4500 people in
1960 to 3100 people, according to the 1970 census. An above averc>.f;e pe1·cent-.nge
of"the ad~lt males are presently listed as unemployed. The townspeople are
interested in maintaidng the town 1 s quaint a.tmosphore as it is, and yet they
are equally interested in preventing the town frcm becoming a ghost town, as
has happened in similar places. \<~hen the town council (the legislative body
of the to~m) was approar.hr:Jd by representatives of the cornpam•" and asked if
certain zoning laws could be char.ged to permit the building cf th!! factor/
in the town, the council mad~ no initi?J. evaluation on the cc-rrpany 1 s request,
but dµ,cided to fcrm a fact-findiI'g ccrr.Jllittee to d:l.sc,.,ver co;ne objective
infor~e.tion about the company.
The tmm 1 s fact-find~.n~ ccrr:mittee reported
that the co.:r,par.y, inco1IJ01·atcj in 1961 , has shown a high re.te of p~,·ofi t and
growth over the last dcc-'l.de. The compa.:iy has registol.'ed a large number of
patents, and over t.1ro-thirdJ of the p·~oducts resulting from these patents have
large and increasir.g rnarl•et.s, toth domestic and foreiG::i. The con:pany is in
urgent need to e~-pand its facilities to tap these llllU'kets.·
The committee also found that the conpeny pays its empl<'.'yees an above
average wage, and ezrployce f!'inge benefits are rated as 11 re'->~ectable" on
industry wide criteria.. ro1• the five '3ites on L>Jhich ths ccrr.pany has built
similcr facilities i:.1 t!!a last three years, the average cost of the buildings
has been in the ne:i.gh0orhood cf 'two and one-half million do3.lars, and the
number of men e~ploycd has bGen approxim~tely 550, of which 390 are unskiJJ.ed
or semi-skilled workers.
·
Since the collllllittee's task,on1y consisted of presenting obj~ctive
information to the r,ouncil, it did not make any judgment on the feasibility
of tho coillpany 1 s proposal for the town. The town council chose to involve
the whole town in dccidi::i.g upon tha proposal, and a special election was
scheduled. The issue is an importa..'1t one, as it affects the towu as ·a whole,
and each individual resident in many ways.
1

l

lj
.1
J

'.rhe town 1 s one newspaper decided not to publicly.take sides, but to
allow all the citi::iens to e;.-press their views o:i.1. the issue. In a special
edition, the ne::sp.?.per encoi.i:::·aged the residents to write letters expressjng
their views on the con::>a=-~Y 1 s propos3.l, and thes·e lett.cr.s ti"ere prElsented in
toto. In order to acr.omcdat.e as nu:.n.y letters as possible, the editor restricted
the letters to a bl"ief listing of arguments for or ageinst th9 proposal. One
such letter wa~ l·andomly selected for the study in wi:"iich you are presently
rm·ti.c:i.pati.ng •

..
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The purpose of this study is to determine whether there are wa ys
of differentiating good voters from bad voters in state a1d Federal
elections. This particular study grew out of a recent controversy in
Congress concerning possibJe differences in the manner of thilikfog between 18 to 20 year olds, and those 21 and over. This research, sponsored by the joint congressional committee on voter regulations and
by several state legislatures , is being undertaken in selected collages
and universities throughout the country to study the probJe m, and to
make recommondaticns concerning tho establishment of meaningful criteria
to evaluate the quality of voter judgement aid behavior, to he used in
the 1972 Presidential election. Specifically, this study is concerned
·with two qµestions: Are there meaningful differrnces in ability to
weigh information between those individuals 18 to 20 years old and those
21 and over? Can college stud~nts critically evaluate material relevant
to politica.1 iss1.1Gs·, ai1d make sound :u:td :i.ut.el] :igfmt .inrlgt>tni:>uts r.nw~P.t'U··
ing what they have read.

DIRECTIONS
On the next page you will find a blank sheet of paper. Detach this
sheet and place it on the side of your desk. On the following page,
you will find a list of arguments included in the letter by one of the
town's residents. Please read each stntemcnt carefully, and immediately
after reading each statement, write a responee to that statement on the
blank sheet on the space provided. Include all your thoughts uid fe:..•linga
on the statement. ilrite as much as you want, but express only one id.ca
in each sentence you write.

The following letter was written by one of the leading citizens of the
verJ respected and intelligent person who has performed a number
of public scrvicns in .the town throughout his lifetillne. He has been an
influencial member of the town 1 s civic organizations, and the: general
feeling in the tmm is thnt he is a trustworthy and honorable man. This
prominent resident has spoken out on the major issues affecting the town's
future on man;~r occasions in the past. He concluded his letter stating
that ho mi.s definitely nen.inst the comp:m_y 111<.JV'ing into the tmm, due to
t.J1•=- ~- ••., o,u~A> m• ,11 I; i •.,,.,.1 ( aud J'.L'.i 111;,•<J ht--J ow ) •

ton:, c..

'

...
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The purpose of this study is to standardize some of the materials in the
study for use in later research. We are not particularly interested in your
attitudes or opinions, but only to see if the materials can be used in later
studies.

DIRECTIONS
On the following page, you will find a list -of argur.ients which were included P1ease read the statements carefully.

by one of the town's residents.

.l

!

,.

'
·!

\

The following letter uas written by a middle aged t1an, one of the few
people to move into the town recently (within the last six months, according
to his letter). This mo.n le.ft !·. .is fo!'i:le!' residence in a."'lot'her state after he had
run unsuccessfully for a small r~blic office. He stated that he had few
supporters there, as others did not understand him and apparently did not place
much trust and confidew::e in him~ Al though having made few friends in his present
town as yet, he claims to understand the feelings of the town. He concluded his
letter stating that he 1-ras definitely against the company moving into the town,
due to the reasons mentioned. (and printed b~ow).

10)

Pl.case write your responses to each statement in the space p~ovided.

A.

B.

c.

D•
.,
i'

.. F.

''i.

1
l

1

o.

·.1

;

1

1.

J.

\
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A.

The CO?llla?lY plans to build on la:;.1d set aside as a park and recront.i onl'l.1.
iirea,, one of the nice:r placeo in town. There are no other-are~s in
town suitable for a park.

B.

Crime is on the rise in the town.
c.'.l;ripany moves in!

c.

'!'!:ere will be much morP. noise in the +,o;m with an the hustle and bustle
of truck traffic,, pcol'le rus:ii:;g about, and ciJ.l the+..

D. The style of life in this to;:rn

Who knows what will happen when the
- -- - · ·

,.~i.11

be altered r<?d:.ccl.ly.

E.

'l'hare' s even a che.nce so:n,3 o.f the 11atural resources of the town ( onr water supply, pler..t and wildlife, ai.r) will be jeopardi~ed. I think
the tow.i council is r..ot t:':lli1~3 u:.: all they know!

F.

This cor.ipa!ly has hinted t:i~t it will build more and r:tore throuzh the
years--1::2.ybe e-.ren other corr,_;:-anies will enter once t!1e precedont is set.
This will ju.st COf.!.PO~"ld the problems!

G.

You never know what tho~~ ecientists are doing in that research center
thoy pla:.1 to b·.:ild., ei·;;.r.~r!

H. The

to~mts

whole life will revolve around th.;i work shifts :!.n the .factory.

I.

Suppose they want to hire people from the outside! .

J.

'!'he :factory will be huge--it just-won 1t

£it

into- ou: to~riir-::--

.·
·)

..
-·---~··--

\

10.S
On this page, we would like you to indicate your personal feelings about
the truth of the statements lis~ed below by circling the on~ number th~t best
indicates your judgment of the truth of that statement. Notice that the la~ger
the number the more true the statement is judged; the smaller the number the
JDOre false it is judged.
·.
.

Please respond to each of the statements on this page by indicating ~our
opini<l!! of the statement's truth. Answer the CJ.Uestions in the
order presented, and do not skip any question. Work rapidly, but read the
statements carefully.

~Ee!'~~

: I

1. I fully encourage the town coun~il to grant the company its request to move
into the town.

<....

·I

I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11 I 12 I 13 I 14 I 15 I

Ti:>efini tely/ Protatly 7~;.;tain I
False
False

'"
i

I

I

-.. \

.l -::- (

2.

Probably
True

I Defir;i tely /
True

The problems the company will cause in the town are very great.

j

~-

1

. 3. My feelings on this issue are very intense •

1// 2 I 3 I h I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11I12 I 13 I 14 I 15 I
Definitely Probably I Uncertain / Probably
/ Definitely /
.false
False
True
True

-l

4.

I feel nzy- position on this issue is very important to me.

L2 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 1o I 11 I 12 I 1 3 I !li._/ 15 I
(Definitely?Pr0babfY7' Uncertain I Probably
/ · Defln:LteIY7
False
False
True
True

· L L/_2__/_J_ I 4

I

'

.·...,-j

l
. l1
.,l

i

..... -

-.
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At this time, we would like you to look back to the responses which
you wrote to the ar~uments written by one of the town's residents. We would
like you to evaluati:i your own responses on the degree to which they are
favorable or unfnvorable to tho town resident's position on the issue. Please
score each sentence separately on the following basis:
+2 very favorable to the resident's position.
+1

somewhat favorable to the resident's position.

0 completely neutral
-1

som~1hat

-2

v~ry

unfavorable to the resident's position.

unfavorable to the resident's position. _

Pl.ease put the rating number to the left of each sentence
have written.

.

I
~

·I.

\

~hat yo~
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Pl.ease circle the appropriate number which best expresses your feelings.
Answer the statements in the order presented •
. What do you think of the company moving into the t01m?
1

...-,

2
Very

3

h 2

6

7

8

9

10 . 11

12

13

Unfavorable

14

12·

Very
Favorable

Rate your degree of involvement in this issu13.

.

1 2 3 h 5 6
Not at all involved
(Couldn't care less)

_.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1h 15
Very nruch
involved

If you were a resident of the town, how would you view the compatzy" 1S
request to enter the town?
,!

1

1
1

l.

1
·i .

'

\

\,

2

~

having all
BAD points

h

2

6

1

a· 2

having both
good and bad
points

10

11

12

13

14 15
ha-,;ing all
GOOD po_ints
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Pl.ease answer the following questions as.accurately as you can •.
1. EconoI!lically speaking, the bulk of the town's residents could be categorized
as
• (poor, middle class, or rich)

2. How many individuals were residents of the town in 1960?

In 1970?

3. By what method will the issue finally be resolved?

4,

Characterize l!S best you can the resident who wrote the lettar that you read
by checking the ar-propriate number on each line.
2
a, 1
3
extremely
untrustwor t;hy

4

2
b. 1
extremely
ignorant

3

4

c. 1

2

4

3

4

2
e. 1
extremely
threatening

2

4

t.

3

4

;

h

2

extrem!'!ly

5

6

neut.ral

7

2
d. 1
not at all
active in

;

j

9

trustworthy

5

6

7

8
9
oxt!'emely
intelligent

5

6

7

8
9
extrgmeIY
co;rpetent

5

6

7

5

6

7

. 9
8
not at all
threatening

5

6

7

8
9
not out to
persuade

5

6

7

8
9
did w~;:t
compar.iy to
JnOve in

neutral

neutral

inco~etent

,.

8

ext~e:r.idy

neutral

8

9

active
in town

ve~y

·town

J

l

I
g.

J

·l '.

l

·.'

2

out to
perouade
1

2

did not want
company to
J11ove in

s.
l
J

1

neutral

neutral

neutral

Briefly, what was the stated purpose of this experiment?

. ·-----. ·------·-

.
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On this page, please list as many of the arguments written by the t01zn•s
resident as you can. (Please number each separate argument.}

,·

·- ..._.

:

\

..

•
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Since it is essential that the students participating in this ezj,eriment
have no knowledge beforehand of the materials contained in this booklet arid
of the nature of this exoeriment, I PP.IJHISE NOT TO DISCUSS AlJY ASPECT OF THIS
EXPERIME''NT WITH OTHER COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS FOR THE DURATION OF THIS
EXPERII-IENT (UNTIL MAY, 1971)

Signed: __~--~-~~~~~--~~~-~~~Do you have any comments about the experiment or the experimenter?

Do you feel that you were ndstreated in any way?

Have you heard of this experiment previously which :may have affected your responses?

If so, please explain.

In the past, we have found that the results of such studies are affected by how
hard the studant tried during the experiment. Some studan~s get very involved in
the study 1 others do not. Without any penalty of any sort (you will still receive
your experimental cre:iit), could you help us by indicati;·:6 yot r involvement or
interest in this particular e::.periment. In other words, please give us an
indication of 11 how hard you tried. 11
1

1

2

3

h

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

(The experimenter will eJ..'Plain the exact
is finished.)

12

13

14

15

t:•ied very
hard

tried not
at all
nat~re

of the experiment when everyone

AGE: _ _ _ _ __

/It
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